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U.S. military forces are transitioning to network centric operations, as described 
in Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020. Warfighting elements will function as 
individual nodes in a global information grid with an end-to-end infrastructure that 
provides information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. 
This transition will place additional demands on wireless communications and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. However, current and 
planned space-based communications solutions are costly and have significant shortfalls. 
Likewise, ISR systems will have difficulty fulfilling near real-time requirements and 
sensor-to-shooter roles. One possible solution is through the use of emerging 
stratospheric platforms. In the area of communications and ISR support, this thesis; 
reviews the Services’ doctrines and future warfighting needs, identifies available space-
based systems along with their shortfalls, and defines support capabilities from the 
stratospheric environment. It then provides an in-depth review of emerging high altitude 
long endurance (HALE) platforms, analyzes HALE platforms survivability, provides a 
concept of operations (CONOPS) for HALE employment, and performs a HALE 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii





A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH ...........................................................................1 
B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................5 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY / LIST OF CHAPTERS.............................6 
II. REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................9 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B. SERVICE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................9 
1. Marine Corps .......................................................................................9 
2. Navy.....................................................................................................11 
3. Army....................................................................................................12 
4. Air Force .............................................................................................13 
C. MILITARY BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS ........................................13 
1. Introduction........................................................................................13 
2. Navy Bandwidth Needs......................................................................14 
3. Commercial Reliance.........................................................................15 
III. CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS AND ISR SYSTEMS.....................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................19 
1. Mobile Communications ...................................................................19 
2. Wideband Communications..............................................................21 
3. Protected Communications ...............................................................23 
C. ISR SYSTEMS ...............................................................................................25 
1. Electro-optical ....................................................................................25 
2. Synthetic Aperture Radar.................................................................28 
3. SIGINT Related Missions..................................................................29 
IV. STRATOSPHERIC CONSIDERATIONS..............................................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B. STRATOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT .......................................................31 
C. STRATOSPHERIC TECHNICAL ISSUES ...............................................32 
1. Coverage .............................................................................................32 
2. Link Budget ........................................................................................35 
D. COMMUNICATIONS/NETWORK ISSUES .............................................39 
1. Bandwidth Capacity ..........................................................................39 
2. Frequency Reuse ................................................................................40 
3. LPI/LPD..............................................................................................41 
4. Jamming..............................................................................................42 
E. ISR ISSUES ....................................................................................................43 
1. Resolution ...........................................................................................43 
2. Near Real Time (NRT) Support .......................................................47 
 viii
V. HALE PLATFORMS OVERVIEW ........................................................................49 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................49 
B. GLOBAL HAWK ..........................................................................................50 
1. Background: .......................................................................................50 
2. Specifications ......................................................................................51 
3. Advantages..........................................................................................54 
4. Disadvantages.....................................................................................54 
5. Mission Suitability .............................................................................54 
6. Challenges...........................................................................................55 
C. PROTEUS.......................................................................................................55 
1. Background ........................................................................................55 
2. Specifications ......................................................................................56 
3. Advantages..........................................................................................57 
4. Disadvantages.....................................................................................58 
5. Mission Suitability .............................................................................58 
6. Challenges...........................................................................................58 
D. HELIOS ..........................................................................................................59 
1. Background ........................................................................................59 
2. Specifications ......................................................................................59 
3. Advantages..........................................................................................62 
4. Disadvantages.....................................................................................63 
5. Mission Suitability .............................................................................63 
6. Challenges...........................................................................................63 
E. SOUNDER......................................................................................................64 
1. Background ........................................................................................64 
2. Specifications ......................................................................................65 
3. Advantages..........................................................................................67 
4. Disadvantages.....................................................................................67 
5. Mission Suitability .............................................................................67 
6. Challenges...........................................................................................68 
F. SKY STATION ..............................................................................................68 
1. Background ........................................................................................68 
2. Specifications ......................................................................................70 
3. Advantages..........................................................................................70 
4. Disadvantages.....................................................................................70 
5. Mission Suitability .............................................................................70 
6. Challenges...........................................................................................71 
VI. SURVIVABILITY .....................................................................................................73 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................73 
B. SPACE VULNERABILITIES ......................................................................73 
1. Natural Causes ...................................................................................73 
2. Launch Risks ......................................................................................75 
3. Hostile Actions....................................................................................76 
C. HALE VULNERABILITIES........................................................................77 
1. Natural Causes ...................................................................................77 
 ix
2. Terminal Risks ...................................................................................77 
3. Hostile Actions....................................................................................78 
VII. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS................................................................................81 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................81 
B. RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ...................................................81 
C. EMPLOYMENT ISSUES .............................................................................82 
1. Global Hawk.......................................................................................82 
2. Proteus ................................................................................................83 
3. Helios...................................................................................................83 
4. Sounder ...............................................................................................84 
D. MISSION SUPPORT AREAS......................................................................85 
1. Communications Connectivity..........................................................85 
2. ISR Support........................................................................................85 
3. Strategic Deterrence ..........................................................................86 
4. Blue Force Tracking ..........................................................................86 
5. GPS Support.......................................................................................87 
E. CONOPS SCENARIOS.................................................................................88 
1. Chinese-Taiwan Conflict ...................................................................88 
2. Middle East Conflict Scenario ..........................................................89 
VIII. HALE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .....................................................................91 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................91 
B. COMPARATIVE PROCESS .......................................................................91 
C. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................91 
D. ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................92 
1. Instantaneous Access Area................................................................92 
2. Cost......................................................................................................93 
3. Endurance...........................................................................................95 
4. Survivability .......................................................................................97 
5. Feasibility............................................................................................99 
6. Flexibility ..........................................................................................100 
7. Responsiveness .................................................................................103 
E. HALE ANALYSIS SUMMARY.................................................................105 
1. Near Term.........................................................................................106 
2. Long Term ........................................................................................107 
IX. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................111 
A. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................111 
B. CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................111 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................113 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................115 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xi




Figure 1. HALE Altitude Coverage ................................................................................33 
Figure 2. Instantaneous Access Area (0-5° Look Elevation angles)...............................34 
Figure 3. Instantaneous Access Area (10-30° Look Elevation angles)...........................34 
Figure 4. Look Elevation Angle ......................................................................................37 
Figure 5. HALE Resolution.............................................................................................44 
Figure 6. Global Hawk (From: USAF Global Hawk Program Overview Briefing) .......51 
Figure 7. Proteus (From: NASA Dryden Flight Research Center) .................................56 
Figure 8. Helios (From: NASA Dryden Flight Research Center)...................................60 
Figure 9. Helios Solar Wing (from NASA Dryden Flight Research Center)..................61 
Figure 10. Sounder (From: Autonomous High Altitude Airships Brief) ..........................64 
Figure 11. Sky Station (From: Sky Station web site)........................................................69 
Figure 12. Taiwan Strait Scenario.....................................................................................89 
Figure 13. Middle East Scenario .......................................................................................90 
Figure 14. IAA Comparison..............................................................................................93 
Figure 15. Cost Comparison..............................................................................................95 
Figure 16. Endurance Comparison....................................................................................97 
Figure 17. Survivability Comparison ................................................................................99 
Figure 18. Feasibility Comparison ..................................................................................100 
Figure 19. Flexibility Comparison ..................................................................................103 
Figure 20. Responsiveness Comparison..........................................................................105 
Figure 21. Comparison Analysis Results – Near Term Solution ....................................107 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii




Table 1. Aircraft Carrier Bandwidth Requirements.......................................................15 
Table 2. SATCOM Category .........................................................................................19 
Table 3. EO Regime Comparison ..................................................................................27 
Table 4. SAR Regime Comparison................................................................................29 
Table 5. SIGINT Regime Comparison ..........................................................................30 
Table 6. Free Space Path Loss .......................................................................................39 
Table 7. Military Communications Systems Theoretical Data Rate Limits ..................40 
Table 8. HALE Categories.............................................................................................49 
Table 9. IAA Score Results............................................................................................93 
Table 10. Cost Score Results ...........................................................................................95 
Table 11. Endurance Score Results..................................................................................96 
Table 12. Survivability Factors........................................................................................98 
Table 13. Survivability Score Results..............................................................................99 
Table 14. Flexibility Factors ..........................................................................................101 
Table 15. Flexibility Score Results ................................................................................102 
Table 16. Responsiveness Factors – Measurements and Weights .................................104 
Table 17. Responsiveness Score Results .......................................................................105 
Table 18. Matrix Results – Near Term Solution............................................................106 





























A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether emerging technologies 
involving High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) platforms have significant military 
capabilities for Network Centric Warfare in terms of providing wireless connectivity and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support to tactical warfighters. 
Specifically, the authors wish to answer the following questions. What is the current 
status of military and commercial HALE developmental efforts? And, how well are 
HALE platforms suited to fulfill emerging requirements and satisfying known warfighter 
deficiencies in current requirements? 
In order to do this, several general areas of research are covered. First, space-
based platforms are identified that currently support wireless connectivity and ISR 
missions. These platforms are analyzed to identify where there are limitations in the 
move towards Network Centric Operations using both current and planned space-based 
systems. Secondly, the research will identify mission areas where HALE systems offer 
unique capabilities over space-based and lower altitude platforms. Third, specific HALE 
systems in development are described to show their current status, advantages, 
disadvantages, and challenges. Fourth, analysis in terms of survivability and concept of 
operations (CONOPS) will show the operational potential for HALE craft in the 
communications and ISR roles. Fifth, comparative analysis will be presented to show the 
differences between the various HALE systems researched. Finally, the authors will 
provide their views of the overall potential of HALE systems and give their 
recommendations on how the Navy and Marine Corps should proceed in integrating these 





There is a new concept being used to describe the way US forces must organize 
and fight in the information age. The idea is called “Network Centric Warfare” and is 
defined in a variety of ways. One definition describes it as “an information superiority-
enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking 
sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of 
command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a 
degree of self-synchronization.” [Alb00, p. 2]  
In the context of this thesis, it relates to two themes. First, it essentially means that 
warfighters are individual nodes with connectivity to the entire defense information 
infrastructure. They are able to push or pull information as needed to maintain consistent 
real-time battlespace awareness. This connectivity allows for immediate request and 
response to issues such as transmitting commands to subordinate units or requesting 
support from higher headquarters. This also provides for fast tempo operational 
capabilities with a synergistic effect on an opponent. Second, it means that there must be 
an ISR architecture in place that feeds the information needs directly to the warfighters in 
a near real-time (NRT) capacity. This ISR information must be easily assessable to all 
those in the network. 
Network Centric ideas tie neatly into traditional warfighting theories. Network 
Centric Warfare can have a profound effect on the ideas of “fog” and “friction” defined 
by the historical war theorist, Carl Von Clausewitz. The “fog” of war is the uncertainty in 
warfare that is derived from a lack of accurate intelligence. [How89, pp. 117-119] By 
implementing a Network Centric architecture, it is possible to reduce, although not 
entirely eliminate, the difficulties of fog by improving capabilities for NRT accurate 
battlespace awareness with capabilities that currently do not exist. 
In terms of how these Network Centric capabilities can enhance the means of 
command and control, the following two historical theories apply. First, Network Centric 
Warfare can decrease Clausewitz’ concept of “friction” on the battlefield. “Friction” 
relates to the difficulties commanders encounter when trying to implement their 
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command and control decisions under the cloud of uncertainty or fog that accompanies 
war [How89, pp. 117-119]. By maintaining a consistent operating picture and continued 
connectivity with the command structure, commanders will be able to better direct their 
forces under reduced fog. Unlike past conflicts, where tactical connectivity seldom went 
farther than line-of-sight, this new capability will provide worldwide reach for 
commanders in the tactical arena.  
Second, in terms of a more modern theory on warfare, Network Centric 
advantages can be expressed in terms of Col. John Boyd’s “OODA loop” theory. Col. 
Boyd was a US Air Force fighter pilot who transformed his views of tactical aerial 
combat into a theory on the decision-making process in combat, and then applied it to all 
levels of warfare. “He contends that all rational human behavior, individual or 
organizational, can be depicted as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks—
observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA)”. [Fad94] The basic concept is 
that commanders operate inside their own OODA loop and to succeed in combat, they 
must complete the OODA process faster than their adversaries. By doing this, they can 
maintain a higher tempo of operations and thus have the advantage because opponents 
will continually have to repeat the first step of orientation in the command and control 
cycle, hindering effectiveness. Network Centric Warfare will be a decisive tool in 
command and control because it will allow commanders to get inside opponents’ 
decision-making process. The knowledge sharing and connectivity will allow 
commanders to act immediately on the battlefield on a worldwide scale and have their 
subordinates receive commands immediately.  
The means to reaching this Network Centric capability is the difficult part today 
and the focus of this thesis. The end goal is enticing; Network Centric Warfare will 
enable a Military–Technical Revolution by combining new technologies with innovative 
operational strategies to fundamentally alter the way US forces fight. This revolution is 
characterized by: technological change, military systems evolutions, operational 
innovation, and organizational adaptation. Network Centric Warfare will enable all of 
these. [Kre92]  
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The first military power capable of becoming Network Centric will have a distinct 
advantage on the battlefield. 
Two future joint warfighting documents, Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) and Joint 
Vision 2020 (JV 2020), cement the requirements to attain a Network Centric 
environment. In the area of this research, they identify a number of future needs. 
JV 2010 identifies the following: 
• Fused Battlefield and Battlespace Visualization 
• Accurate interactive picture showing friendly and enemy force 
dispositions 
• Information superiority which provides an uninterrupted flow of 
information with reachback capabilities 
• Lightweight communications gear to increase connectivity for individuals 
and small units 
• Standardized data with an interoperable architecture throughout the theatre 
of operations  
• Fusion of all-source intelligence with widespread sensor-to-shooter 
capabilities 
• Real time information support to command and control architectures. 
[JV10 p.11-13] 
 
JV 2020 builds upon the JV 2010 vision and adds: 
• The development of a concept labeled the “global information grid” which 
provides for the network centric environment. This will be the end-to-end 
set of information capabilities that provide information on demand to 
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.  
• In terms of Command and Control - Joint Force Headquarters and 
subordinate headquarters that must have mobility, dispersion, and remain 
connected with a common standardized network. [JV20, p.12, 39]  
 
The question is where to begin? 
Before the operational doctrine or C4I architecture is established to accomplish 
Network Centric goals there must first be the “infostructure” or hardware, software, 
protocols, spectrum, etc. that will enable all other actions. In terms of connectivity, 
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military forces need the physical “plumbing” or throughput capability for the enormous 
amount of information that must travel over the grid. Ships cannot drag fiber optic cable 
behind them and land mobile units cannot plug Cat 5 cables into an outlet in the field. 
This severely limits the options in terms of connectivity mediums and forces warfighters 
into the wireless realm. Secondly, ISR platforms need to give near real time 
responsiveness, long dwell times for continuous awareness and high resolution to identify 
threats, locate targets, and identify friendly forces. This research analyzes a number of 
space-based and stratospheric platforms to determine a viable direction to take in order to 
get this required “infostructure”.  
 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
There were two basic themes behind this research. First the authors wanted to 
identify the areas where space systems are lacking in providing tactical commanders 
required communications and ISR assets to effectively conduct operations in the 
information age. The prevailing thoughts in the space community are to solve these issues 
with primarily an integrated space architecture, so this thesis revisits the reasons why. 
Secondly, this thesis reviews the current development of civilian and military programs, 
which might offer stratospheric solutions to communications and ISR problems.  
In defining the shortfalls in space-based communication, a review was conducted 
of all current and planned space-based communications platforms in three categories; 
mobile, wideband and protected communications. In each category, the research covered 
capacity for normal and surge operations and identified areas where users are 
unsupported. In regards to space-based ISR platforms, an analysis was conducted in 
generic terms as they relate to the different space regimes and commercial remote sensing 
technology in order to keep the research unclassified. 
In reviewing the currently developing HALE platforms, research was done by 
numerous means. First, the authors conducted an extensive web search to find the HALE 
designs that were being planned or developed. Background information was collected 
from news releases and company briefs. Then, various program offices were contacted to 
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speak with qualified representatives on each HALE project team. Finally, a number of 
on-site visits were conducted to government and civilian research facilities and 
corporations that are conducting HALE development and stratospheric satellite 
augmentation development. This provided the ability to accurately determine how these 
systems were progressing and to get the required data to conduct trade studies to 
conclude the research. 
The authors did not set out with the intent to discredit space capabilities. The goal 
was to show that the services need an integrated solution to known deficiencies using 
various communications and ISR mediums to meet future warfighting needs. The desire 
was to determine whether developing HALE systems actually were capable, suitable, and 
feasible to perform niche services in the drive to a Network Centric Environment.   
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY / LIST OF CHAPTERS 
 
This research is comprised of nine chapters. The first three provide essential 
background information and identify space-based communications systems and ISR 
shortfalls. Chapters four through six cover in detail the stratospheric environment, the 
specifications of the various HALE platforms and their survivability issues in a combat 
environment. Chapter seven provides a notional concept of operations (CONOPS) for 
HALE systems. Chapter eight is a HALE platform comparison analysis. Chapter nine is a 
wrap-up, including the authors’ analytical conclusions and recommendations for utilizing 
HALE assets. The following bullets provide a summary of the chapters: 
 
• Chapter I – Introduction. This chapter states the purpose of this thesis, 
gives a detailed background to the themes in the paper, provides the scope 
of the research and outlines the thesis organization. 
• Chapter II – Requirements. This chapter provides the backdrop for 
determining shortfalls in connectivity and ISR assets. It covers the current 
and developing doctrines of the four uniformed services. It also shows 
what the projected shortfalls are in the current and planned bandwidth 
requirements. Finally, it briefly covers options for procuring extra 
bandwidth and ISR support from commercial assets. 
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• Chapter III – Current Communications and ISR Systems. This chapter 
covers the current and planned space based assets in the inventory for 
providing connectivity and ISR support. In the wireless communications 
realm, it will detail each major program in terms of protected, wideband, 
and mobile communications. In terms of ISR, it details, in an unclassified 
format, capabilities and deficiencies of space-based platforms in terms of 
GEO, MEO, and LEO orbits. 
• Chapter IV – Stratospheric Considerations. This chapter gives an overview 
of the stratospheric boundaries and weather patterns. It details various 
issues where the stratosphere offers significant or unique advantages over 
space platforms for communications and ISR. It provides comparative 
analysis between HALE systems and satellites. It lists applicable mission 
areas where the stratosphere offers unique mission capability to the 
warfighter.  
• Chapter V – HALE Platforms Overview. This chapter begins with a brief 
categorization of various HALE programs. It then gives an in depth 
analysis of the developing programs researched in terms of background, 
specifications, advantages, disadvantages, and challenges. 
• Chapter VI – Survivability. This chapter first covers survivability issues 
relating to satellite utilization. It will then cover parameters on each HALE 
system’s ability to survive in a combat environment. It will detail issues 
such as; radar cross-section, infrared signature, maneuverability, onboard 
self protect capabilities, and operational deployment.  
• Chapter VII – Concept of Operations. This chapter details potential 
applications for real-world operational support in both the 
communications and ISR missions. It covers potential deployment 
capabilities, range of coverage in-theatre, on-station times, and logistical 
support requirements. 
• Chapter VIII – HALE Comparative Analysis. This chapter provides 
comparisons between the HALE platforms researched in terms of 
instantaneous access area, costs, endurance, survivability, feasibility, 
flexibility, and responsiveness. 
• Chapter IX – Conclusions. This final chapter will first summarize the 
breadth of the research. It will provide the authors conclusions on the 
viability and importance of integrating HALE platforms into the C4ISR 
architecture. It then provides recommendations on how the military should 






























Before analyzing the various HALE platforms for military suitability, a review 
was conducted into what the services will require in the future to conduct military 
operations. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the services’ current and emerging 
warfighting doctrines as they relate to communications and ISR. Then, previous studies 
are reviewed that outline the extent to which bandwidth and ISR deficiencies extend. 
Finally, an analysis is done concerning the potential for tapping commercial space assets 
in supporting communications and ISR needs. 
 
B. SERVICE REQUIREMENTS 
 
1. Marine Corps 
 
The Marine Corps’ current doctrine is Operational Maneuver From The Sea 
(OMFTS), which cements its focus on fighting future battles in the littorals. The Marine 
Corps has modernizing this doctrine for the 21st century and has renamed it Marine Corps 
Strategy 21. 
In the area of intelligence, OMFTS states “Technology that permits rapid 
dissemination of intelligence products will play an important role.” [OMF01, p.12] In the 
area of command and control it states that communications systems must be designed that 
“provide units with control over the information they need.” [OMF01, p.12] This is a 
push from communications networks to information networks. Marine Corps Strategy 21 
builds on OMFTS and tries to merge it to support JV 2010 and 2020 visions. In the area 
of this research, it aims to have “network operational communications, information, and 
intelligence systems and provide global access capabilities to domestic and international 
information resources.” [MSC21] 
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The Marine Corps clearly acknowledges the push towards a network centric 
environment. Network Centric Warfare is becoming a major focus of the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWFL) as it attempts to validate certain global grid concepts. 
The MCWL is actively engaged in the Kernal Blitz Exercise and recently participated in 
Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) India to attempt to validate network centric warfare 
concepts in an amphibious operation. “It demonstrated a wireless network that could 
relay voice, data, and imagery over-the-horizon, to Marines at the squad level.” [Lin01]  
A hurdle the Marine Corps faces is the need to have a system to provide this concept 
theatre-wide on a twenty four hour/ seven days a week (24/7) continuous basis using the 
full electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. In FBE-India, they used a civilian aircraft as the 
relay platform and were able to get up to only 8-9 km wireless range to mobile users on 
the ground with acceptable data rates.  
The Marine Corps has defined operational needs in supporting its mobile users to 
move towards a network centric capability, however, they still are searching for the right 
platform to fulfill these needs. The following needs for the mobile users were provided 
by the MCWFL and have been broken down into specific technological requirements. 
They include: 
 
• Coverage of a typical operational area – support for units up to the size of 
Naval Expeditionary Forces or Marine Expeditionary Forces. 
• Continuous global assured access  
• Secure voice/data comms to link small tactical units, including their 
command elements and fire support platforms up to a distance of 200 nm 
• Bandwidth up to 9.6 kbps 
• Netted communications capabilities 
• Connectivity down to the squad level. For a deployed MEF, up to 40 
voice/data nets with up to 300 tactical terminals per battalion. 
• Mobile terminal sets weighing less than three pounds 
• A minimum Look Elevation angle of 20 degrees for suburban and rural 
environments and 40 degrees for high-rise urban areas 
• Secure capabilities to include LPI, LPD, and Anti Jam 
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• No dependency on ground infrastructure to close the links 
• Minimal manning, logistics and support [MCW01] 
 
Meeting these specifications alone will be a major task, but these requirements 
only comprise a portion of the total force that will likely be involved in major combat 
operation. The US Army will need similar support to some of these requirements. The 
MCWFL’s current focus is on a space-based Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation and/or 
a Geostationary Orbit (GEO) constellation to fill these needs. In Chapter III of this thesis, 





The Navy and Marine Corps’ combined vision for the 21st century are rooted in 
the From the Sea and Forward… from the Sea doctrine documents of the early 1990’s. 
Emphasis has been placed on the littoral battlespace, supporting the full spectrum of 
conflict, providing global power projection, and having the capacity for interoperability 
in the joint and combined environment. Annual posture statements have re-emphasized 
the Navy’s mission statements, but recently there has been a notable shift towards 
acknowledging the needs for integrating information superiority into all aspects of 
warfighting.  
Recently, the Navy Warfare Development Command published Network Centric 
Operations, A Capstone Concept for Naval Operations in the Information Age to 
articulate the Navy’s compliance with JV 2010 and JV 2020 concepts. This document 
underscores “the increasing importance of information as a source of power” [NCO01 
p.1]. Each of the four pillars of Network Centric Operations (NCO) has applicability to 
this thesis. They are: 
 
• Gaining the Information and knowledge advantage 
• Assured access 
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• Effects-based operations 
• Forward sea-based forces. [NCO01, p. 1] 
 
The Navy after Next will rely on a tiered sensor architecture to gain battlespace 
knowledge. The bulk of the sensor data will continue to come from scarce national and 
theater assets, but a dense network of sensors will be needed to fulfill a wide range of 
requirements. Integrated sensor data will allow a shift toward less sophisticated weapons 
that draw precision from network centric operations. [NCO01] 
To further illustrate the emergence of a Network Centric Force, the Naval War 
College has recently taken network centric operations as its focus. “The Naval War 
College conducted a Network Centric Warfare Symposium on August 14, 2001, kicking 





Army Vision 2010 is the follow on doctrine to the Army’s Force XXI concepts 
and aligns its vision with the JV 2010 requirements. Army Vision 2010 clearly states a 
growing need for enhanced wireless communications and ISR platforms to fulfill its 
needs. To achieve Dominant Maneuver/Precision Engagement, the soldier of tomorrow 
will require a range of capabilities, to include: 
 
• Sensor-to-Shooter Links 
• Real Time Intelligence…. Vertical and Horizontal Distribution 
• Information Dominance 
• Battle Command on the Move. [DOA10, p. 14] 
 
The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) bandwidth requirements for a single 
division currently stand at 5.1 Mbps. This figure does not account for either intelligence 
13 
or logistics support [ABC99]. If Army growth trends compare to the Navy’s projections 
by 2006, 5.1 Mbps will exceed 17 Mbps. The Army acknowledges, “the transformation 
to the total Army will place additional narrowband requirements on its existing 
oversubscribed communications infrastructure.” [NSC01] Future communications 
systems must support small hand-held, hands free or pocket-sized terminals for soldiers 
on the move. Emphasis will be placed on netted communication with a degree of low 
probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD).  
 
4. Air Force 
 
The Air Force Doctrine of the future is Air Force Vision 2020, which is consistent 
with JV 2010 and JV 2020 concepts. Of all of the services, the Air Force appears to have 
the least problems in transforming to a Network Centric Environment. Operating from 
land-based airfields has its advantages. The Air Force considers itself expeditionary, 
however, their basic infrastructure is not constantly on the move like the other services. 
Their demand for throughput, although large, is generally easier to achieve. Network 
connectivity is often obtained via direct fiber hookup or can be achieved with high 
capacity wideband fixed satellite systems. The Air Force still needs better support for its 
mobile users such as their tactical aircraft; however, their numbers are far less than the 
other services. 
 




Before making a case for how HALE systems best fit into a communication 
architecture, an exploration is needed on current and future bandwidth requirements. 
Throughout the Department of Defense there have been numerous studies and many 
different projections on bandwidth needs. They all draw the same conclusion… the 
services are severely lacking, especially when considering support to large numbers of 
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users and surge operations. This demand will only increase as the force transitions to 
network centric operations.  
 
2. Navy Bandwidth Needs 
 
During Desert Storm, the Air Tasking Order (ATO) was published and distributed 
daily throughout the theatre of operation by air courier.  The services did not have the 
communications infrastructure in place to send the ATO effectively or securely over any 
wireless medium. The Navy has made great strides in acquiring additional bandwidth 
since the Gulf War. A combination of military and commercial wideband systems have 
alleviated the immediate peacetime operational need. The difficulty it faces is using these 
systems to provide the projected throughput in surge operations such as a Major Regional 
Conflict (MRC) or when changes in doctrine require more bandwidth.  
Figure 2.1 shows some historical and projected bandwidth data points for a single 
Naval Aircraft Carrier (CV). [NSC01] Note, a power function trend line was added to 
emphasize the fact that future requirements are difficult to predict and are often 
understated. This trend line is only a statistical calculation, a best match, based on 
observed growth patterns. 
As of 2000, the typical CV was capable of exchanging data at about 3 Mbps. The 
sharp rise since the Gulf War can be attributed to Challenge Athena and military SHF 
wideband systems. As you can see, future projections increase dramatically as more 
onboard functions, once considered routine, become “mission essential”. A large driver 
of future projections is the implementation of IT-21. Network Centric Operations promise 
to add more throughput requirements. As the Navy looks forwards to 2006, the following 
requirements drive its bandwidth demands:  
 
• 3 Mbps for SIPRNET and NIPRNET  
• 6 Mbps in DISN connectivity to support JWICS, DSN/phone, VTC, 
telemedicine, telemaintenance, and quality of life requirements. 
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• Over 11 Mbps for JSIPS (Primary Imagery Dissemination), non DISN 
VTC capability and an occasional requirement to link to the Predator 
UAV. [NSC01] 
 
Keep in mind that these numbers are only for the CV. Neither the rest of the CV 
Battle Group nor additional bandwidth needs for network centric operations are factored 

























Table 1.   Aircraft Carrier Bandwidth Requirements 
 




The services have successfully fulfilled some of their bandwidth shortfalls 
by leasing transponders on commercial SATCOM systems. The proliferation of 
commercial GEO and large LEO systems makes leasing an attractive alternative for DoD 
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planners, but concerns exist over assured access, availability, and suitability for wartime 
communications.  
There are hundreds of communications satellites in Geostationary orbit 
and it would seem as though there would be an abundance of transponders to lease 
commercially, but this is not always the case. Satellite vendors do not typically launch 
their systems until they have sold 80% of their capacity. This practice helps ensure 
financial success. The additional 20% goes on the open market to the highest bidder. The 
Department of Defense is somewhat reluctant to contract for commercial SATCOM until 
systems are on orbit and operational. [NSC06] Therefore, there is a bidding process for 
the remaining scarce resources. Suffice it to say, US forces are not always successful in 
obtaining these resources. Recent operations in Kosovo provide a case in point. 
Of the over 200 candidate GEO satellites, only three had transponder 
availability and accessibility to the Kosovo region. Of those three, two were Ku-band 
transponders, and one was a C-band transponder. In total, only 70 Mbps of bandwidth 
was commercially available, but the bandwidth need for the potential ground war was 
200 Mbps [NSC06].  
In the late 1990’s, there was a good argument for leveraging large LEO 
commercial systems when it appeared that they would proliferate. Iridium is a perfect 
example of why the DoD cannot expect too much from novel commercial enterprises. 
Iridium’s multi-billion dollars, 66-satellite constellation promised global reach to a 
selected portion of the wireless communications market.  However, a poor business 
model and few subscribers left the company in financial ruin. The Navy has since signed 
a short term contracted for a good number of handsets and unlimited airtime, but is 
finding it difficult to integrate this capability into its overall communication network 
infrastructure. But obtaining resources is just one of DoD’s problems with reliance on 
commercial systems. 
Military commanders rely on assured access to communications in all 
phases of conflict. These “assurances” are often hard to obtain from commercial vendors. 
Many are members of international consortiums or have signed international agreements. 
The rights to these resources/transponders could be pulled because of political concerns 
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and/or conflicts of interest. Thus, reliance on commercial bandwidth can never be 
absolute. The Advanced Military SATCOM Capstone Requirements Document 
emphasizes the need for unique military systems  
“While it is clear and desired that DoD take full advantage (where 
affordable) of the commercial sector’s capabilities and offerings, it must 
be recognized not all of the warfighter’s communications needs can or 
should be met by commercial means, especially in an unpredictable threat 




There have been a number of commercial remote sensing satellite systems 
put on orbit by the US and other international and multi-national corporations that offer 
Electro optical (EO), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), and Multi-spectral imagery. In 
terms of imagery resolution, they offer significant military intelligence potential. Systems 
like Ikonos can image at up to one-meter resolution, considered sufficient for targeting. 
However, problems with assured access and timely product delivery preclude these 
systems from fulfilling NRT warfighter needs. These corporations are in the business of 
providing services to the customer; however, one cannot reasonably expect these services 
to meet the stringent requirements of time critical military intelligence. Advanced 
contracting for these systems presents difficulties in determining what imagery needs will 
exist in future conflicts. Thus, commercial sensor support presents military users with 
difficulties in getting responsive operational support and continuous surveillance 
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III. CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS AND ISR SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Before showing how HALE platforms can effectively integrate into wireless 
communications and ISR architectures, it is important to understand how well current 
systems support warfighters’ needs and the shortfalls that exist. The authors first describe 
existing and planned Satellite Communications (SATCOM) platforms as they relate to 
providing support to the national military structure. Next, an unclassified analysis is 
conducted on the capabilities and deficiencies of ISR system operations from the 




Wireless communications systems occupy a large portion of the EM spectrum and 
are classified in a number of different ways. In the scope of this thesis, they are 
categorized in three general areas: Mobile, Wideband, and Protected communications. 
This section covers SATCOM platforms in terms of the types of communication missions 
each support, and the deficiencies that remain. Table 3-1 depicts how the general 
categories relate, albeit roughly, to the Electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. 
 
Category Band Frequency 
Mobile  UHF 300 MHz – 3 GHz 
Wideband SHF 3 – 30 GHz 
Protected EHF 30 – 300 GHz  
Table 2.   SATCOM Category 
 
1. Mobile Communications 
 
Connecting mobile users into the network centric environment will prove to be 
toughest challenge. Mobile users require small, lightweight terminals with the capability 
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to operate through weather and foliage. Ultimately, users would like a cellular sized 
terminal with voice and data capability. This lightweight requirement and mobility 
typically means that warfighters need omni-directional antennas. The associated low 
power, low gain, and attenuation issues push the mobile warfighter primarily into the 
UHF spectrum. This UHF reliance reduces the amount of throughput, and ultimately, the 
number of users supported. Furthermore, the military UHF allocations of 225-400 MHz 
provide the lowest possible data transfer rates. 
Mobile users are currently supported primarily via the UHF Follow-On (UFO) 
constellation. UFO is an eight spacecraft constellation with two satellites in each of the 
four worldwide coverage areas. The last of the UFO satellites, UFO-11, is slated for 
launch in December 2003. Though this system gives worldwide, ubiquitous coverage, it 
is lacking in several important areas. Foremost, UFO provides limited availability. The 
number of channels the system can support is limited by spectrum allocation. Currently, 
the system is oversubscribed by about 250% and cannot meet the user’s needs in terms of 
capacity, comms-on-the-move, and network control [Nic01]. Another limitation involves 
communications requirements for urban areas. The Marine Corps has a defined look 
angle requirement of 40° for urban operations. However, from geostationary orbit, a 40° 
look angle is not possible above 43.5° North and below 43.5° South latitudes. This 
restriction would exclude, for example, all of Europe north of Italy.  
A number of studies, such as the Mobile User Study (MUS), were conducted to 
analyze potential solutions to the mobile problem. The proposed solution is the Mobile 
User Objective System (MUOS). This proposal is a multi-faceted system encompassing 
terrestrial and space assets.  
On the terrestrial side, the MUOS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
lists a number of solutions, to include, Airborne Communications Nodes aboard UAV’s, 
Aerostats, and manned aircraft. It discusses, at length, the performance requirements but 
not specific platforms to be utilized. [MUO00, p.2]  
On the space side, the MUOS plan calls for a six-satellite GEO constellation with 
the first launch targeted for 2007. However, the Navy led MUOS program office is 
considering delaying the initial MUOS launch in favor of extending the current run of 
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UFO satellites through UFO-12 and UFO-13. MUOS’s projected cost is 3-4 billion 
dollars and the hope is to have them operational for more than 10 years. MUOS, like 
UFO, is slated to operate in the military UHF band, which will limit its capacity. [Wal01] 
 




Military and commercial Super High Frequency (SHF) wideband 
communications systems provide the warfighter with large throughput and global reach 
back capabilities. Wideband systems carry the majority of intelligence, imagery, VTC, 
and Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) traffic. These systems are typically 
“bent pipe” versus processed, meaning the satellite simply receives, translates, amplifies 
and retransmits the signal to the ground terminal. Complexity of such systems is placed 
on the groundside vice the space segment. Ground stations transmit high power signals 
via large, high gain antennas. Users must be capable of supporting these large antenna 
configurations.  
Currently, the warfighter relies on a combination of government and 
commercial SHF satellite assets. The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) 
III program is the mainstay of the SHF wideband communications capability. The Global 
Broadcast System (GBS) was launched aboard UFO satellites to increase wideband 
capabilities via a “broadcast” service. Challenge Athena (CA) is the Navy’s most 
successful wideband commercial venture. Terminal fielding began onboard USS George 
Washington in 1992. The current system, Challenge Athena III is being fielded on all 
CV/CVNs, and proliferation has begun to AGFs, LCCs, LHAs and LHDs [NSC03]. 
Shortfalls in existing wideband capabilities include; support to 
disadvantaged users, comms-on-the-move, interoperability, and protection. Future 
systems include the Interim Wideband System, to be followed by the Advanced 
Wideband System.  
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b) Interim Wideband System (IWS) 
 
The three components of the IWS are the Wideband Gapfiller System 
(WGS), DSCS III, and GBS. 
 
(1) Wideband Gapfiller System - The Wideband Gapfiller 
System (WGS) vision is to support the tactical warfighter via a constellation of three 
GEO satellites. Deployment of the system is to begin in 2004, and should reach full 
operational capability by 2005. The goal of the satellite’s design is to fully leverage 
commercial technology, to include, higher power transponders and more efficient 
bandwidth modulation techniques. WGS key performance parameters include the 
following threshold requirements: 
 
• 1.2 Gbps minimum throughput 
• Fully interoperable with current DSCS III and GBS systems 
• Life cycle costs not to exceed $1.181 billion. [NSC04] 
 
WGS shortfalls include, support to the disadvantaged user, comms-on-the-move, anti-
jamming protection, and flexibility. 
 
(2) DSCS III - The current DSCS III constellation is made up 
of five primary satellites and five residual systems. The residual satellites provide backup 
services in the event a primary satellite fails. Worldwide coverage is achieved through the 
placement of satellites in five geosynchronous orbital slots. The DSCS program supports 
a diverse mix of users, providing intelligence information, DISN services, and support to 
the tactical warfighter. The current DSCS satellite improvement plan is called the DSCS 
III Service Life Enhancement Program (SLEP). Under this program, the DSCS III 
satellites have received more powerful amplifiers in all channels, improved low noise 
amplifiers, and an addition channel with access to the gimbal dish antenna. These 
enhancements support the warfighter by increasing capacity and coverage, especially to 
small, disadvantaged terminal users. The shortfalls of the DSCS III and DSCS III SLEP 
are protected communication, comms-on-the-move, and flexibility. 
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(3) Global Broadcast System (GBS) - The Global Broadcast 
Systems was conceived to better serve the warfighter by providing rapid data 
dissemination via large capacity K-band satellite transmitters. Using commercial Direct 
TV-like technology, GBS provides broadcast only data at rates up to 23 Mbps [NSC04]. 
Three satellites have been launched, but terminal fielding has been slow due to funding 
issues. The strength and weakness of the GBS is its broadcast only capability. At the time 
of its conception, throughput via any means was the priority; however, this decision does 
not fit well into the network centric vision of the future. Broadcast services, by design, 
have numerous shortfalls, including poor bandwidth efficiency, interoperability, 
flexibility, and protection.  
 
c) Advanced Wideband System (AWS) 
 
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved a wideband 
roadmap that includes the procurement of an entirely new constellation of wideband GEO 
satellites in the 2008 timeframe. The AWS is to leverage off WGS best practices and 
emerging commercial technology. [NSC03] 
 




Protected communications are a unique military requirement. These 
systems must be nuclear hardened, resistant to physical destruction and jamming, and 
have defensive information operations capabilities. Additionally, protected systems 
employ low probability of intercept/detection (LPI/LPD) techniques to maintain 
covertness. Future military doctrines promote the use of protected systems to ensure 
information dominance. Current protected communications systems include three Milstar 
Satellite Communications System, two Fleet Satellite (FLTSAT) EHF Package (FEP), 
24 
three UFO/EHF Package (UFO/E), four Enhanced UFO/E Package (UFO/EE), and one 
Interim Polar EHF System satellites. [NSC05] 
 
b) Milstar Satellite Communications System 
 
Milstar is a joint service protected satellite communications system. It 
represents a “leap” in U.S. communications capability, serving as a “smart switchboard in 
space.” [MSC99] The first two Milstar satellites were only capable of a low data rate 
(LDR) mode of operation (75 bps to 2400 bps). The first of four planned Milstar 2 
medium data rate (MDR) capable (4.8 kbps to 1.544 Mbps) satellites was placed in a 
useless orbit by a Titan IV-B upper stage Centaur rocket motor in April 1999. One of the 
remaining three MDR Milstar 2 satellites was launched in February 2001. [NSC05] 
Milstar satellites can link to one another using a W-band frequency 
crosslink. A fully operational constellation of Milstar satellites would allow worldwide 
EHF connectivity without the use of any ground relays. 
The major shortfall of Milstar is its low throughput and interoperability. 
By design, “most of the EHF MILSATCOM bandwidth is used to support the protected 
waveform (spread spectrum and symbol repetition).” [NSC05] Custom EHF terminals 
must actually log onto the satellite network.  
 
c) Advanced EHF (AEHF) 
 
The future Advanced EHF communications satellite system is scheduled 
to replace Milstar beginning in December 2005. A fully operational AEHF constellation 
would consist of four fully crosslinked satellites providing worldwide coverage. The 
system promises to greatly increase capacity to the warfighter while maintaining Milstar-
like protection capacities. Changing requirements have already led to cost increases and 
schedule delays in the program. The original cost of $2.5 billion is now estimated at $4.3 
billion, according to an Air Force spokesperson. [Tut01] 
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C. ISR SYSTEMS 
 
The current ISR system infrastructure is a system-of-systems spanning from 
terrestrial to space regimes. This section shows the general capabilities and deficiencies 
that current platforms in the US ISR architecture provide to the warfighter.  This 
information is provided in generic terms relating ISR mission requirements to 
performance characteristics from four operating regimes: Geostationary Orbit (GEO), 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and stratospheric stations. The 
Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO), or Molniya, regime has been omitted due to its similarity 
to GEO. HEO provides polar coverage at apogee altitudes near GEO, and therefore 
shares similar long dwell (although not continuous) and coverage characteristics. Specific 
ISR systems capabilities and shortfalls will not be discussed due to their classified nature. 
The data provided in this section lays the analytical foundation for the next chapter that 
details HALE advantages in these critical mission areas.  
Three ISR mission categories are covered in this section, encompassing a broad 
range of ISR missions conducted to support operational requirements. The general 
mission categories are; Electro-optical (EO) imaging, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
imaging, and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) related collection capabilities. It will become 
clear in the following tables where these systems leave gaps in providing capable and 




Electro-optical (EO) imaging instruments are passive sensors that typically detect 
EM radiation in the visible and Infrared (IR) spectrum. EO systems provide day/night 
capabilities for general intelligence, targeting, and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). 
Support for these critical mission areas is dependent on the following essential EO 
characteristics: resolution, dwell time, access, and instantaneous area access.  
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The resolution of an optical system is defined as its ability to distinguish fine 
detail [Wer99, p. 263]. The variables that determine resolution are the operating 
wavelength, the altitude of the sensor, and the diameter of the sensor’s aperture.  Visible 
sensors have better spatial resolution due to shorter wavelengths (.4-.9 µm) as compared 
to IR detectors operating at wavelengths of 1-100 µm. Equation 1 shows the relationship 




2.44           
Where = Ground resolution at nadir
             = Satellite altitude
             = Wavelength









    Eqn. 1 
 
The following measures are used for the comparative analysis found in Table 3: 
 
Resolution: High – Target Quality Images 
  Med –  Local Area Coverage 
  Low –  Wide Area Coverage 
 
Dwell is the period of time the sensor maintains view of the object or target. In 
general, the longer the dwell time, the better the operational support to the user. Longer 
dwell allows for video surveillance and enhanced targeting and BDA support. The 
following criteria are used throughout this section:  
 
Dwell Time: High – Continuous or NRT coverage 
  Med –  Greater than 15 minutes but less than Continuous 
  Low –  Less than 15 minutes 
 
Access area is defined as “the total area on the ground that could potentially be 
seen at any moment.” [Wer99, p. 263] As a satellite orbits, or an aircraft flies through the 
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atmosphere, sensors are able to gain access to various portions of the Earth’s surface. 
This accumulated coverage area can be global or constrained to regional or local areas, as 
determined by orbital inclination and altitude. Further restrictions are placed on airborne 
or stratospheric platforms due to international airspace boundaries.  Access for a single 
platform is defined as: 
 
Access:  
  Global –  Pole to Pole 
  Worldwide –  65° N to 65° S  
  Local –  Within theatre of operations 
 
Instantaneous access area (IAA) is defined as “all the area that the instrument or 
antenna could potentially see at any instant if it were scanned through its normal range of 
orientations.”  [Wer99, pg. 164]  The limiting factor is the horizon, thus the higher the 
altitude, the larger the access area. For the analysis in Table 3 through 5, IAA is given for 
a range of look elevation angles from 0° (horizon) to 30°. Look elevation is an angular 
measurement, made from the observer’s local horizon to the satellite, aircraft, or HALE 
platform. The look elevation angle is determined by the warfighter’s need   
The following altitudes have been used for comparative analysis purposes: GEO 
is defined as 35,786 km, MEO 20,184 km, LEO 700 km, and HALE 21.33 km (70,000 
ft).  
Table 3 shows the comparative capabilities of the stations studied. 
 
Regime Resolution Dwell Access IAA (nm2) for 0-30° 
GEO Low High Worldwide 63,249,000 – 29,128,000 
MEO Low Med Global∗ 56,628,000 – 24,655,000 
LEO High Low Global∗ 7,370,000 – 858,000 
Stratosphere High High Local 248,000 – 1,230 
Table 3.   EO Regime Comparison 
 
                                                 
∗ Requires a highly inclined orbit 
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2. Synthetic Aperture Radar 
 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging systems are day/night, all weather 
capable. They use platform motion (satellite or aircraft) to synthetically produce an 
aperture length of sufficient size to obtain a specific image resolution. Equation 2 is used 
to calculate azimuth (cross range) resolution distance for a synthetic array [STI98, pg. 
424]. However, a theoretical minimum cross range resolution exists for a focused SAR 
system. That minimum value is D/2, where D equals the real/physical antenna width. One 
can defeat this minimum by using a Spot Mode technique, and thus obtain the resolution 
expressed in Equation 2 with proper processing algorithms.  
 
a           d 2
Where  = Wavelength
= Array length








      Eqn. 2 
 
As evident from Equation 3, the effective antenna length is a function of radar 
motion. In order to obtain an image in a reasonable amount of time, a sufficiently fast 
platform is required. Problems associated with long exposure time include frequency 
coherency and motion within the frame. SAR images are computationally more difficult 
to process and harder to interpret than EO/IR images. 
 
             = 
Where  = Effective antenna length
             = Velocity of the radar platform







   Eqn. 3 
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For the following capabilities comparison, the same orbit parameters and 
measures of effectiveness are use as those on the EO chart. 
 
Regime Resolution Dwell Access IAA (nm2) for 0-30° 
GEO None High Worldwide 63,249,000 – 29,128,000 
MEO Low Med Global∗ 56,628,000 – 24,655,000 
LEO High Low Global∗ 7,370,000 – 858,000 
Stratosphere High High Local 248,000 – 1,230 
Table 4.   SAR Regime Comparison 
 
3. SIGINT Related Missions 
 
This comparative analysis covers the rest of the ISR missions, to include: Signal 
Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and other 
INT’s systems.  Although traditionally considered strategic, these missions are 
increasingly gaining tactical relevancy. The goal of the collection platform is to position 
itself “in view” of the target emission, and be close enough to the source to “sense” the 
data. The ideal collection system has long dwell, continuous global access, geo-location 
capabilities, and sufficient sensing ability to detect the specific signal/signature of 
interest. 
For the comparative analysis of this mission area, the same orbital parameters are 
used as with EO and SAR. However, for the measures of effectiveness, instead of 
resolution, a sensor’s signal strength rating is included. In terms of signal strength, the 
closer the emission is to the collector, the easier it is to sense. This is primarily due to free 
space path loss, discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  
                                                 




Regime Signal Strength Dwell Access IAA (nm2) for 0-30°  
GEO Low High Worldwide 63,249,000 – 29,128,000
MEO Medium Med Global∗ 56,628,000 – 24,655,000
LEO High Low Global∗ 7,370,000 – 858,000 
Stratosphere High High Local 248,000 – 1,230 
Table 5.   SIGINT Regime Comparison 
 
                                                 
∗ Requires a highly inclined orbit 
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IV. STRATOSPHERIC CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The essential considerations for operating in the stratosphere are analyzed in this 
chapter. It is important to understand the technical areas where the stratosphere provides 
both enhancements and adequate alternatives to space-based systems. The chapter has 
been formatted into four sections; 1) an overview of the stratospheric environment, 2) a 
discussion of the general technical issues affecting both communication and ISR 
employment 3) a look at specific communications and wireless network related issues, 
and 4) an analysis of specific ISR issues. 
 
B. STRATOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
The stratosphere is the upper layer of the atmosphere that extends from roughly 8 
to 12 miles at the lower end to the upper edge at about 30 miles. This equates to about 
39,500 ft to nearly 152,000 ft. The regime of primary concern for HALE platforms is the 
altitude below 100,000 ft where the upper reaches of our HALE craft operate. The air 
temperature in the stratosphere remains relatively constant up to an altitude of about 16 
miles, and then increases gradually. This increase with altitude does not cause significant 
convection and thus has a stabilizing effect on atmospheric conditions in the region. 
Ozone plays the major role in regulating the thermal regime of the stratosphere, and 
water vapor content within the layer is very low. 
The lack of water vapor prevents cloud formation, therefore rain and icing is not a 
concern. Winds are the only significant weather issue. But, stratospheric winds are 
relatively benign compared to those in the troposphere, especially near the tropics and 
within defined boundary layers. The most stable layers appear to exist around 70,000 and 
90,000 ft altitude. Mean wind speeds of 0-70 kts are typical at these altitudes, within +/- 
40° latitude of the equator. Additionally, stable temperature and low winds result in light 
turbulence in the stratospheric environment. 
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C. STRATOSPHERIC TECHNICAL ISSUES  
 
A HALE platform cannot provide the same amount of wide area coverage as 
satellite systems, but to what extent does their coverage fall short? In terms of link 
margin, how well will GEO systems support large numbers of small terminals?  
The following issues affect both communication and ISR operations. The analysis 
in this section shows that stratospheric altitudes can provide sufficient coverage and 
greatly increased link margin to better support communications and ISR operations in the 




Though HALE systems have smaller coverage areas, they do have the capacity to 
monitor an entire area of operations from a JTF commander’s perspective. The maximum 
radius of coverage is determined by the platform’s altitude and the required look 
elevation angle. The look elevation angle is measured from the local horizon of the 
observer to the satellite or HALE platform. 
The look elevation angle is determined by the warfighter’s need. For example, 
communications in an urban environment may have a 30-40° requirement, an imagery 
system may not be capable of looking less than 20°, but a SIGINT system may be 
capable of supporting the warfighter out to the platforms line of sight limit (0°). Figure 1 





























Figure 1.   HALE Altitude Coverage 
 
Another important measure of a systems ability to provide coverage of an area is 
Instantaneous Access Area (IAA). IAA is defined as “all the area that the instrument or 
antenna could potentially see at any instant if it were scanned through its normal range of 




       (1 cos )
Where  = Look elevation angle








  Eqn 4 
 
As with the maximum radius coverage calculations, IAA calculations are 















































Figure 3.   Instantaneous Access Area (10-30° Look Elevation angles) 
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To get a truer sense of the extent of HALE platform coverage, the reader may 
wish to turn to Chapter VII, Concept of Operations, for a more graphical depiction. 
 
2. Link Budget 
 
The following calculations give a comparative analysis between HALE and 
space-based platforms in the area of link requirements for communication needs. A key 
to communications engineering is the necessity of closing the link between transmitter 
and receiver, while providing a sufficient degree of margin. The same holds for SIGINT 
systems, except the collection system design is the only variable. This area offers perhaps 
the greatest advantage for stratospheric systems over space-based assets. Greater link 
margins enable a number of specific warfighter needs: 
 
• Smaller and lower power man-portable terminals  
• Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection (LPI/LPD) 
communications 
• Reduced electro-magnetic interference (EMI) 
• Greater sensor sensitivity - to detect and locate low power emissions 
 
Numerous characteristics determine the ability of a system to close the link. 
Transmitter gain, antenna gain, and receiver gain are designed to overcome atmospheric 
attenuation and free space path loss. Free space loss is the single largest driver of satellite 
communications links. The spreading of the transmitted beam, and thus the power, over a 
wider area as it travels great distances results in significant loss. From Equation 5 and 6 
one can see that the intensity of the signal is inversely proportional to the square of the 
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Where  = Wavelength  
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   Eqn. 5 
Or 
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Where  = Speed of transmission (speed of light assumed) 
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 Eqn. 6 
 
Finding the distance between the transmitter and receiver requires a few 
additional steps. Figure 4 identifies all the factors needed to calculate the maximum range 
based on a given look elevation angle. Intermediate steps include calculating both the 
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H = Altitude of satellite
Re = Earth Radius
Max Range = Rmax
Re
Look Elevation angle =  ε
Earth’s central angle =   λ
Nadir angle =  η
 
Figure 4.   Look Elevation Angle 
 
Maximum range and free space loss example: Consider a Geosynchronous 
satellite, transmitting a UHF signal at a frequency of 300MHz. The observer on the 
ground requires a minimum Look Elevation angle of 10°. 
 
Given: H = 35,786 km 
Re = 6378 km 
f = 3.0 x 108 Hz 
c = 3.0 x 108 m/s 
ε = 10° 
 
To find Rmax, first calculate the satellite’s Nadir angle (η). 
 
1 6378sin cos10 8.57
6378 35786
η −   = • =  +  
D D  
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Some simple geometry results in the calculation of the Earth’s Central angle (λ). 
 



























• • • 
 
 
Similarly, values for HALE, LEO, and MEO altitudes were calculated. Table 6 
shows the results of the Free Space loss comparison for a 300MHz UHF signal. Note the 
free space path loss difference for a GEO satellite at an altitude of 35,786km compared to 
a HALE platform at an altitude of 65,000ft. A 51.43db difference in signal strength 




    ≅  
 
In summary, given the same transmit out power and antenna gain; the GEO 
satellite signal would arrive over 100,000 times weaker at the Earth’s surface. An even 
greater concern is signal transmission in the other direction, from the low power ground 
terminal to the satellite. 
39 
 




65000ft 19.8km 108.85km -122.72db 
95000ft 28.9km 155.8km -125.84db 
LEO 700km 2155.3km -148.65db 
MEO 20184km 24701km -169.84db 
GEO 35786km 40586km -174.15db 
Table 6.   Free Space Path Loss 
 
D. COMMUNICATIONS/NETWORK ISSUES 
 
The following technical issues are provided to analyze the stratospheric 
capabilities that relate only to the communications/ network implications. 
 
1. Bandwidth Capacity 
 
Essentially, higher frequency bands enable an increased capacity to transfer data. 
This issue becomes paramount as the transition to the network centric environment takes 
place and attempts are made to move even larger amounts of data. The Shannon Limit 
(Eqn. 10) formula is used to compute information capacity or throughput. It determines 
the maximum data transfer rate based on the available bandwidth. It is a linear function if 
the same percentage of the bandwidth is utilized.  
 
10 = 3.32  log 1  
Where  = Information Capacity
            = Bandwidth








   Eqn. 10 
 
Table 7 shows the maximum possible data rates, according to the Shannon limit, 
for current military communications systems. Data rates are based on a S/N of 1000 (30 
40 
db), which was simply used to demonstrate the relative performance between various 
frequencies. The available bandwidth used for each calculation is 10% of the frequency.  
 
Frequency Bandwidth 
(10%) of Freq 
Comms System Band ID Data Rates 
(Shannon Limit)
138-144 MHz 13.8-14.4 MHz Air/Grnd Radios VHF 138-143 Mbps 
225-400 MHz 22.5-40 MHz AF/FLT SATCOM, UFO Mil UHF 224-399 Mbps 
1.575 GHz 157.5 MHz GPS L1 L Band 1.57 Gbps 
2.2-2.9 GHz 220-290 MHz Space-Ground Link 
System (SGLS) 
S Band 2.19-2.89 Gbps 
7.9-8.4 GHz 790-840 MHz DSCS (UpL) Mil X Band 7.87-8.37 Gbps 
20.2-21.2 GHz 2.02-2.12 GHz GBS (DnL) K Band 20.1-21.1 Gbps 
30-31 GHz 3-3.1 GHz GBS (UpL) Ka Band 29.9-30.9 Gbps 
43-45 GHz 4.3-4.5 GHz MILSTAR (UpL) V Band 42.8-44.8 Gbps 
Table 7.   Military Communications Systems Theoretical Data Rate Limits 
 
The essence of this section is that it will benefit the warfighter to utilize higher 
frequencies to increase throughput. As was described in the link budget section, higher 
frequency use requires more power due to greater attenuation and losses, again limiting 
the mobile users. HALE based systems offer the shortest distance, mitigating this higher 
power requirement and enabling higher band usage. 
 
2. Frequency Reuse 
 
Frequency allocation is a major concern for both military and commercial users. 
In order to prevent EMI problems, the federal communications commission (FCC) 
assigns the frequency bands in the US while the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) does this on the world scene. The military UHF spectrum (225-400 MHz), for 
example, is a very limited resource. This resource is shared by chopping up the frequency 
into narrow channels, either 5 or 25 kHz wide, or employing frequency management 
schemes like Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) where the bandwidth is 
dynamically assigned on an as needed basis. Through these methods support is provided 
to a wider number of users in a geographical region, but at the cost of reduced throughput 
to any individual user.  
41 
Frequency reuse issues are particularly significant with UHF frequencies because 
omni directional antennas are most often used vice focused beams. Therefore, mutual or 
unintentional interference is more prevalent if users are not spaced far enough apart 
geographically. The first method of frequency reuse is “allocating the same frequency to 
more than one cell” [Tom88, pg. 286]. In effect, this is done; except GEO satellites form 
huge cells and very little worldwide reuse is achieved. Recall, only four geographical 
regions are supported via the UFO constellation. Since adjacent cells cannot reuse the 
same frequency, the UHF spectrum is reused only twice. HALE systems have smaller, 
more concentrated footprints capable of much greater frequency reuse if configured in the 
manner of a terrestrial cellular system. The second method of reuse is via orthogonal 
polarizations of the transmitted signal. Here the same frequency carrier is transmitted 
twice, once by way of horizontal linear polarization, the other via vertical polarization. 
The receiving terminal perceives only the matched polarized signal, ignoring the signal 
90° out of phase.  
One issue that is beyond the realm of this research but might enhance the use of 
wider bands in the EM spectrum is the issue of frequency allocation. From a satellite 
designer’s standpoint, communications systems must operate in the allocated band for 
legal and interference reasons. Growth potential is restricted in this allocated band. The 
cellular tower concept of frequency reuse from space is limited, though not impossible, 
because of the larger footprints involved. HALE platforms, on the other hand, have more 
flexibility. First, it might be possible to use other bands on a not-to-interfere basis, 
because the lower power requirements will lessen the potential for interference. 





There is a defined need from tactical warfighters to have communication systems 
that will not be easily detected or intercepted by hostile forces. One method to alleviate 
the LPI/LPD problem is to reduce the transmitter power. The close proximity of HALE 
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systems to the theatre of operations makes it uniquely suited to allow low power 
transmitters that can satisfy the link margin requirements. With more link margin to play 
with, HALE platforms could migrate to higher frequencies, enabling higher data rates, 
which would allow for shorter duration, burst transmissions that are harder to detect. 
Another means by which HALE craft could achieve LPI/LPD is via smaller spot beams 




It is a general concession that the U.S. military reliance on space systems could 
well be its Achilles Heel. Therefore, jamming is a significant concern in a combat 
environment. Space-based UHF assets have footprints that cover an entire theatre of 
operations. If an adversary could successful jam the uplink frequency of one of these 
satellites, UHF coverage to the entire region could be disrupted, severely affecting 
support to widely dispersed warfighters.  
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) and SHF space-based transmissions are 
typically more directional, projecting smaller footprints. Additionally, many of these 
systems have anti-jam capabilities like the ability to null sectors from which jamming is 
originating. These active SATCOM cells do not, however, have enough accuracy to be 
placed at the forward line of troops (FLOT) without the potential for overlapping an 
adversary’s front lines. These deficiencies will provide the capability for hostile forces to 
jam the uplinks inside this overlap.  
In contrast, the close proximity of HALE platforms gives it a more natural 
insulation to jamming in all bands. They have smaller footprints and the added link 
margin to support higher frequencies that can provide more precise directional beam 
control than space-based systems.  
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E. ISR ISSUES 
 
Besides the general coverage issues and link budget concerns for ISR systems, 
resolution and near real-time support are addressed to analyze those issues that relate 






As noted earlier, resolution is the ability to distinguish fine detail and 
Equation 1 is the formula used to calculate ground resolution for an EO or IR sensor. 
Figure 5 provides a comparison of HALE resolutions for imaging a visible signature (.5 




2.44           
Where = Ground resolution at nadir
             = Satellite altitude
             = Wavelength









    
 
A GEO imagery satellite is capable of providing continuous access to one-
third of the Earth’s surface, but resolution capabilities fall short of having military 
significance. Similarly, a MEO system provides global access and adequate dwell time; 
however, resolution is poor using modern EO techniques. LEO systems on the other hand 
can provide target quality imagery and global access; however, dwell time is on the order 

























Figure 5.   HALE Resolution 
 
Space Imaging’s Ikonos commercial imagery satellite provides an 
excellent example of the advantages and disadvantages of a LEO remote sensing system. 
Ikonos is in a highly inclined, sun synchronous, circular orbit at an altitude of 680 km. 
From this orbit, the satellite achieves global coverage and resolution on the order of 1-
meter. However, dwell time is less than 15 minutes per access, insufficient for future 
requirements of continuous near real-time (NRT) capabilities. Ikonos’ revisit time to a 
target at 40° latitude is 2.9 days if the requirement is for a near nadir 1-meter resolution 
image. For a less constraining 1.5-meter resolution image, it would still take 1.5 days to 
return to the target area. [Ols00, p. 78-79] In providing the required sensor-to-shooter 
support, numerous expensive Ikonos type sensors would be necessary to maintain near 
continuous coverage of a theatre of operations. 
A comparison of LEO and HALE imaging resolution capabilities 
highlights the technical complexity involved in space-based imaging. From Equation 1, 
the nadir distance (h) from the satellite/platform to the Earth’s surface is proportional to 
the diameter (D) of the optics for a given resolution and wavelength. Therefore, 
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comparing Ikonos at nearly 700 km to Global Hawk flying at 65,000 ft (19.812 km) 








= = =  
 
b) Synthetic Aperture Radar 
 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging systems use platform motion 
(satellite or aircraft) to synthetically produce an aperture length of sufficient size to 
obtain a specific image resolution. Recall, Equation 2 is used to calculate azimuth 
resolution and Equation 3 determines the effective antenna array length. [STI98, p. 424].  
 
a           d 2
Where  = Wavelength
= Array length








       
 
             = 
Where  = Effective antenna length
             = Velocity of the radar platform







    
 
LEO is currently the only viable satellite orbit for SAR imaging systems. 
At a velocity of approximately 7.5 m/s, a C-band SAR system typically needs several 
seconds, if not tens of seconds, to produce an effective aperture length long enough to 
generate a 1-meter resolution image. This is evident in the following SIR-C/X SAR 
example:  
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Example - NASA’s Shuttle Imaging Radar-C and X-Band Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SIR-C/X-SAR) mission was flown in April 1994 at an altitude of 225 
km. Note, this is a very low LEO altitude. The C-band imaging radar operated at a 
frequency of 5.3 GHz, or a wavelength of 5.66 cm. Below is a notional SAR spot mode 
computation of the image time, given a resolution requirement of 1 m. 
 
Given: ε = 20° 
h = 225 km 
λ = .0566 m 
v = 7.5 km/s 
da = 1 m 
 
The given look elevation angle and spacecraft altitude results in a Rmax of 









= =  
 






Airborne SAR systems fly at much lower altitudes than LEO satellite, but 
at much slower velocities. Thus, exposure time is roughly the same and problems 
associated with long exposure times persist. The U-2 and E-8 Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) are two examples of current military SAR imaging 
aircraft. The U-2 is a stratospheric platform and thus has better access as its chief 
advantage. The E-8 is a much larger airframe, capable of a larger, more powerful SAR 
radar and antenna system. Another potential HALE advantage comes from its ability to 
provide greater link margin. With larger margins over satellites, a HALE platform might 
be better suited to support a higher frequency antenna. Thus, similar resolution could be 
achieved even at lower ground speeds.  
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HALE Example: A Global Hawk flying at 65,000 ft and 310 kts takes a 1 
m resolution SAR image using an X-band (3 cm) radar. Find the image length in time. 
 
Given: ε = 20° 
h = 65,000 ft 
λ = .03 m 
v = 310 kts = 160 m/s 
da = 1 m 
 
The given look elevation angle and HALE altitude results in a Rmax of 
approximately 57 km, and exposure time equals… 
 






2. Near Real Time (NRT) Support 
 
Fused battlefield and battlespace visualization and sensor-to-shooter capabilities 
require significant improvements over current systems. NTR requirements signify 
continuous coverage to support imagery and video. HALE platforms enjoy significant 
advantages over space-based systems in this arena. Extended dwell time is not possible 
from a single LEO satellite traveling at 17,000 MPH. Large LEO constellations be 
required to fulfill this need. GEO based platforms provide NRT capabilities, however, the 
high-resolution imagery needed would require technological breakthroughs from these 
distances. Although HALE platforms can’t provide worldwide or global coverage, they 
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V. HALE PLATFORMS OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is a descriptive chapter of the various HALE systems reviewed for 
this thesis. The following HALE platforms were researched to determine their potential 
in providing the communications “plumbing” and near real time ISR capabilities to meet 
emerging needs to become a network centric force.  
A number of technological advances have occurred over the past ten years that 
have made HALE aircraft a viable option for fulfilling a unique niche in the national 
communications and ISR architecture. The first advance has been the widespread 
application of the Global Positioning System (GPS). This has allowed for the 
development of navigation systems using GPS satellites that permit continuous station 
keeping and autonomous flight routes. The next advance has been in the development of 
lightweight efficient solar cells to provide propulsion and payload power. A third 
advance has been in the miniaturization of electronics, which has enabled the lightweight 
construction of aircraft to reach and stay in the stratosphere. Finally, advances in avionics 
and communications have enabled an entire suite of autonomous unmanned craft. 
The HALE systems research was conducted via site visits and contacts with the 
developers. For each system the authors give a brief background description, then provide 
information on specifications, advantages, disadvantages, mission capabilities, and 
remaining challenges. The HALE platforms fall into four general categories (see Table 
8). 
 
Hale System Category Power Source 
Global Hawk Unmanned aerial vehicle Single jet engine 
Proteus Manned aircraft Twin turbofan engines 
Helios Unmanned solar aircraft Solar  
Sounder Unmanned airship Solar 
Sky Station Unmanned airship Solar 
Table 8.   HALE Categories 
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B. GLOBAL HAWK 
 
1. Background:  
 
The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle 
(HAE UAV) reconnaissance system designed primarily as an ISR platform, but studies 
are being conducted to determine the feasibility of using it as a wireless communications 
node. A recent Milestone II decision has transitioned Global Hawk from a DARPA 
Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) project to an Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) effort and low rate initial production (LRIP) has 
begun. The Air Force is the executive management agent for the program and Northrop 
Grumman is the primary contractor. Of the current UAV development programs, Global 
Hawk is the only one that can reach the stratosphere, provide a significant endurance 
capability, and have global access. 
This HALE platform is the farthest along in its development with the most 
promise in becoming operational in the near future. Its primary purpose is to replace the 
role of the aging U-2 fleet of manned aircraft, but plans are ongoing to add to its mission 
capabilities. Global Hawk is suited to host a wide range of sensors and communications 
packages. The versatility of such a platform in future conflicts could aid military leaders 
in achieving a highly sought after network centric environment.  
In terms on Navy involvement in the Global Hawk program, the deputy director is 
a naval officer who represents Navy interests; however, there is little evidence of 
significant involvement from the Navy in the program development. The Navy is still 
working on a mission statement that provides a vision for the development and 










The global Hawk is a conventionally jet powered, single engine aircraft 
with an extensive on-board processing capability and communications suite. It requires a 
mobile Mission Control Element to control its flights but the aircraft itself it self-
deployable. It recently validated it self-deployment capability by flying a preprogrammed 
route from Edwards AFB, CA to Adelaide, Australia. It has a fairly small logistical tail; 
the mobile support gear can be deployed worldwide using as few as two C-17 or three C-
141 transports. [Nor01] 
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b) Cost  
 
The Global Hawk is experiencing cost overruns, and has come under 
scrutiny by the Government Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO report indicates that 
additional cost overruns could push RQ-4A costs up to $15.3 million per vehicle. 
[USA01]  
 
c) Size  
 
Global Hawk has a length of 44.4 ft and a wingspan of 116 ft, which is 
roughly the same as a U-2. It is 15.2 ft tall and has a maximum takeoff weight of 25,600 
lbs.  
 
d) Performance Capabilities 
 
The aircraft generator creates an additional 9.2 kwatts of electrical power 
to supply its payload. It has the capacity to carry 100 ft3 payloads up to a weight of 1,500 
lbs. The RQ-4A is capable of conducting missions up to 65,000 ft; however, the aircraft 
is not capable of performing a direct ascent to that altitude. After reaching approximately 
55,000 ft it must trade fuel (i.e. weight) for altitude. During test and demonstration flights 
it has flown to an altitude of 66,400 ft. A standard mission profile would allow it to 
takeoff from an 8,000 ft runway, fly 1,400 miles to conduct its mission at altitudes up to 
65,000 ft for a 24 hour period, then return to home base. It has already validated a 
mission endurance flight of 31.5 hours. Its max range is 12,000 miles and its loiter speed 
is 343 kts. [USA02] 
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e) Sensor Capabilities 
 
Global Hawk is suited to carry a variety of sensors. It has an X-band 
Synthetic Aperture Radar that can obtain 0.3 meter imagery in the spot mode and 1.0 
meter in the wide area search mode of operation. Operating in the Moving Target 
Indicator (MTI) mode, the radar has the capability of detecting either opening or closing 
targets at velocities as slow as 2.1 m/sec. from a distance of 20-200 km. Global Hawk is 
equipped to carry a 220 lbs Electro–Optic sensor that is based on COTS technology and 
can image in the visual and IR spectrums. It’s designed to be able to image up to 1900 
targets per day.  
 
f) Communications Suite 
 
The Global Hawk is equipped to operate in a wide spectrum of 
communications bands for both line of sight command and control and beyond line of 
sight data exchange. It is provided with UHF, X-band, Ku Band, and IMARSAT 
capabilities to pass intelligence data and receive command inputs from the Mobile 




The aircraft has been provided with a wide variety of threat detection and 
self-protection capabilities for the combat environment. Overall, the projections are for 
one mission loss in 605 flights, according to the design team. For self-protection from 
enemy detection and attack it is equipped with the following systems:  
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• AN/ALR 89 Radar Warning Receiver to detect search and target 
radars 
• ALE 50 Towed decoy designed to defeat surface-to-air and air-to-
air missiles 





Global Hawk offers a significant endurance advantage over today’s manned 
aircraft. The UAV has a published endurance of up to 36 hours, which could increase by 
adding an in-flight refueling capability. By contrast, manned aircraft are and will 
continue to be limited by human endurance factors, regardless of any in-flight refueling 
capability. The Global Hawk has the flexibility to perform all communication and ISR 





Global Hawk has a slight disadvantage in instantaneous area of coverage due to 
its altitude limitation of 65,000 ft, especially in the wireless communications role. 
Another disadvantage of Global Hawk is its complexity and subsequent logistical support 
requirements. In terms of maintainability, Global Hawk will require about the same 
amount of maintenance support as that of a typical jet squadron.  
 
5. Mission Suitability 
 
Global Hawk is the most versatile of the HALE systems, capable of performing 
every mission required in this area of research. The following are the missions it will be 
well suited to fulfill: 
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• Airborne communications node 
• EO imaging 
• IR imagining 
• SAR imaging 
• SIGINT 
• COMMINT 




The challenges that Global Hawk faces include: 
 
• Validating to the Federal Aviation Administration its capability to 
effectively and safely fly in controlled airspace with manned aircraft and 
land at civilian or military airfields. 
• Developing communications payloads that with fit in the payload 
compartment and provide the widespread wireless connectivity envisioned 






While conducting a document search on HALE platforms a high altitude manned 
aircraft was discovered that was being planned to provide commercial high volume 
wireless connectivity to metropolitan areas. The aircraft, called Proteus, was designed 
and built by Scaled Composites as a concept demonstrator and is currently a one-of-a-
kind aircraft, not yet certified by the FAA. The original High Altitude Long Endurance 
Operation (HALO) concept was to have at least three aircraft flying eight-hour shifts over 
a metropolitan area to provide 24-hour communications coverage. Angel Technologies 
was the original partner for developing the telecommunications suite, which theoretically 
was to support up to 100,000 subscribers. The HALO concept has failed to materialize, 
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probably due to the changing economic condition in the telecommunications industry and 
the proliferation of cellular phone services. The aircraft has since been acquired by 
Northrop Grumman and is a current participant in NASA’s Environmental Research 
Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) program. Northrop Grumman is currently 
using the aircraft as an avionics test bed for the airborne sensors it is developing for 
Global Hawk and other UAV’s.  
 
 






The airplane can carry a crew of two and has a max gross weight of 
15,000 lbs. It was designed with the landing gear spread wide to accommodate an 
antenna dish underneath up to 18 feet in diameter. 
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b) Performance Capabilities 
 
Proteus has an endurance of over 10 hours and a range of over 2300 miles. 
Its maximum airspeed is 160 KIAS and it has a service ceiling of 61,919 ft with no 
payload and 55,878 ft with a 2200 lb payload. The runway length requirements are 7,500 
ft. [Sta01] 
 
c) Payload Capabilities  
 
Its maximum payload capacity is 5,800 lbs, but higher weights reduce its 
loiter time and maximum altitude. It is designed to supply 19 kwatts of power, and can be 
expanded to 30 kwatts, if required.  
 
d) Costs  
 
A representative at Northrop Grumman provided the aircraft costs, which 





Proteus enjoys the most voluminous internal stores capacity of any HALE 
platform. It is capable of housing a large antenna and has the ability to generate ample 
power for communications related applications. This is beneficial in achieving link 
margins sufficient to allow for low powered, lightweight handheld and man-pack 
terminals for communications on the move connectivity. 
Another advantage is that Proteus is a manned aircraft, which allows for 
flexibility in deploying the system. It does not require a ground based control system like 





This craft has a number of disadvantages over the other classes of HALE craft: 1) 
it has the shortest endurance and range, 2) it has the lowest service ceiling and therefore 
the smallest area of coverage, and 3) it is a riskier asset to employ in a high threat 
environment due to possibility of losing aircrew to hostile fire. Proteus could acquire an 
in-flight refueling capability that would mitigate to an extent the range and endurance 
problem; however, the aircraft would continue to be limited by the aircrew rest needs. 
Finally, the aircraft is not yet FAA certified and the engines are still experimental with a 
number of concerns. 
 
5. Mission Suitability 
 
Proteus would be best utilized as a standoff platform. It would remain on the 
periphery until the anti-air threat was diminished significantly or eliminated. In the 




A Proteus type aircraft faces the following challenges: 
 
• Getting a sponsor to promote it’s potential for operational use. Although 
this is a proven aircraft platform it has lost advocates for wireless 
communications applications. 
• Getting FAA certification 
• Developing applicable payloads to support communications and ISR 







The Helios is a solar powered flying wing in development by AeroVironment 
Incorporated in Southern California. Like Proteus it is part of NASA’s ERAST program. 
The company’s future vision for Helios is as  “a ‘Near Earth Orbit’ (NEO) satellite 
complement or substitute, with many potential uses including communications, imaging, 
and reconnaissance” [Hel01]. NASA plans to use the flight data as a baseline for possible 
future expeditions on Mars, since the atmosphere there will be similar to that at 100,000 
ft above the Earth.  
Helios is the latest and largest version of the Pathfinder series of solar powered 
wing vehicles. NASA has two current goals for the Helios. First it wants to validate a 
self-propelled flight to 100,000 ft. This was nearly accomplished on 14 August over 
Kauai, Hawaii when the aircraft made it under its own power to a height of 96,500 ft. 
This broke the previous propeller driven craft record of 80,200 ft set by the Pathfinder-
Plus in 1998, and the horizontal flight record of 86,068 ft set by an SR-71 in 1966. 
NASA’s second goal is to conduct a four-day endurance flight above 50,000 ft. This will 






The test aircraft weighs 1,557 pounds and has a wingspan of 247 feet, 
which is wider than a Boeing 747. Its length is 12 feet from front to rear and it is powered 








The Helios is a very unique craft in that it is a modular design. It is a series 
of solar covered panels that connect to each other and are supported by a long carbon 
fiber cylindrical “spar tube” that runs the length of the craft. The spar sits inside the 
leading edge of the wing. The disassembled craft was viewed as it was preparing to be 
shipped to Hawaii for recent flight tests. The entire wing structure fit inside a single 
container that could be shipped on a truck.   
The power for the Helios is supplied by 62,000 silicon crystal solar cells 
that can provide 35 kwatts of power. They are rated at about 18.4% efficient and are “bi-
facial” meaning they can get solar energy from the top or bottom. Although these are not 
the most efficient cells available, they were selected because of their relative low cost and 
low weight.  
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The wings are constructed with 162 lightweight carbon fiber ribs wrapped 
in a clear plastic sheet to allow maximum penetration of light to the solar cells. The 
landing gear is constructed of simple bicycle wheels. [Hel01]  
 
 
Figure 9.   Helios Solar Wing (from NASA Dryden Flight Research Center) 
 
c) Performance Capabilities 
 
Helios does not have a very complex flight control system in terms of 
moving components. Small ailerons on the trailing edge of the wings control the pitch 
and roll while differential power setting of the 14 propellers controls the yaw. Each 
propeller is driven by brushless DC electric motors producing nearly two horsepower. It 
can operate at 15-18 KIAS, sufficient to overcome average winds at most altitudes 
depending on the time of year. 
From an operational standpoint, the initial design is limited to the 
equatorial region (25° North latitude to 25° South latitude). These restrictions are due to 
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reduced sunlight and higher wind speeds during the winter months. This will not apply 
during summer months where it should be able to range up to the poles. AeroVironment 
claims to have a follow-on aircraft design that will be capable of year round operations in 
the range of 40° North to 40° South. [Tie01] 
 
d) Payload Capabilities 
 
Helios is designed to carry a 220 lb payload and supply it with 1000 watts 
of power. The wing “spar tube” has pod attachments on each main panel. The tube 
provides enough strength to carry the full payload at one point, or it can be spread along 
the full length of the wing.  The follow-on design is capable of roughly twice the payload 




The cost of constructing the Helios prototype was approximately 15 
million dollars. Large-scale production has the potential to significantly reduce per unit 
costs. The telecommunications vision would require at least two assets per region to 




The biggest advantage with the Helios is that it has now proven it is capable of 
reaching nearly 100,000 ft and the area of coverage at those altitudes for ISR and wireless 
communications is significantly greater than other HALE craft. Chapter IV analyzed 
coverage capabilities. Another advantage is that if it can overcome the nighttime power 
problem, it will have an endurance capability unmatched by conventionally powered 
craft. A third advantage is in its growth potential. Solar cell efficiency is continually 
improving. With the silicon cells at only 18.4% efficiency, there is potential for 
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significant power increases with only small increases in solar cell efficiency. There are 




The first disadvantage is its unproven technology as compared to the Global 
Hawk. The next disadvantage is in its operational access. It will not be able to fulfill 
operational needs at the higher latitudes in winter conditions. The final disadvantage is its 
lower payload and power capability compared with the Proteus and Global Hawk. 
 
5. Mission Suitability 
 
The Helios should be able to perform most ISR and wireless communication 
missions. The ones it will have difficulty with are the SAR imaging and SIGINT 




The biggest challenge that Helios must overcome before being considered 
operationally viable for commercial and/or military applications is a nighttime power 
system. AeroVironment’s current goal is to develop a regenerative power system based 
on fuel cell technology.  A prototype device could be ready for flight-testing by 2004. 
The tests would be conducted near the equator to take advantage of daylight solar energy.  
Battery packs have proved to be too heavy for the craft so it has contracted with two 
major corporations to develop an electrolyzer. This is a self-contained system that 
separates water into hydrogen and oxygen for fuel then recombines them for reuse. Other 
options are to carry water that it expendable once separated so that it can increase its 
endurance. This would be their interim solution to get the Helios operational. [Tie01] 
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A HALE document search led to numerous solar powered airship companies with 
concepts and initial funding for large geostationary stratospheric craft. After further 
review only one was found that had actually flown an airship to stratospheric heights. 
The airship, Sounder, was designed and built at the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) 
in San Antonio, Texas. Sounder is a concept demonstrator smaller than most stratospheric 
platform designs with a light payload and low power capability. A site visit of the 
program revealed that the airship conducted a successful launch on 27 Apr 1999. During 
that demonstration test, Sounder reached an altitude of 72,000 ft and stayed airborne for 
six hours. This was first the flight-testing of a solar powered, high altitude airship since 
the 1970’s. The test partially verified the super-pressure design; however, a failure in the 
solar power propulsion system brought early termination to the flight. [Int01] 
 
 







The airship is 124 feet long with a diameter of 24 ft. Its operating weight 




Sounder is constructed of a thin clear 1 mm thick hull of nylon 6 material, 
which is a commercial off the shelf (COTS) item. An Intel 386 class computer that 
utilizes GPS for position keeping controls its guidance system and controls the gimbal 
mounted electric prop for station keeping. A small solar powered two-blade propeller 
weighing a mere two pounds drives the airship propulsion system. Its single solar array is 
unique in that it suspends internally from a set of lines that can turn it to maintain an 
optimum beta angle with the sun. The solar cells are only rated at around 10% efficiency. 
[Int01] 
 
c) Performance Capabilities 
 
The Sounder has a very low maintenance and logistical requirement. It can 
be carried in a single truck with all of its support gear and launched from a small clearing. 
This makes it particularly useful to tactical users because it is designed as a launch and 
leave item. It is injected with a predetermined amount of helium that will fully inflate the 
airship upon reaching a particular pressure altitude. Once on station it is restricted to that 
altitude. According to the design team at SwRI, the airship does not require lengthy FAA 
approval to fly through controlled airspace. Recall that Global Hawk requires certificates 
of approval (COA’s) before every flight. Because Sounder transverses the controlled 
airspace nearly vertically, and rapidly, the only requirement is a Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM). [Int01] 
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Sounder has limited maneuverability. It is designed to be able to station-
keep in winds averaging less than 20 kts. This equates to about 4 KIAS. Its current 
propulsion system is capable of 29.5 kts in daylight and 8.5 kts at night while on battery 
power. The airship will be both altitude and latitude restricted; otherwise, users risk 
losing the airship to the winds, an important operational consideration. The only method 
of retrieval is via rupturing the cell using a small explosive device. Sounder recovers by 
parachuting to the earth. It carries two parachutes; one recovers the payload and one 
recovers the solar array, hull, and motor. [Int01] 
 
d) Payload Capabilities 
 
The Sounder is only capable of supporting a small payload with low 
power needs. It can support a 10 lbs payload and supply it with 100 watts of power. 
These numbers are extremely small by conventional aviation and satellite standards; 
however, Sounder’s payloads do not require the same degree of protection from shock 
and vibration hazards. It is essentially a free-floater, immune to rapid accelerations, rough 
landings, violent launch environment, etc. Consequently, the payloads can be made very 
lightweight, with just the essential electronics. The SwRI designers believe 





Only “rough” cost estimates for the Sounder airship were obtained. To 
date, developmental costs for the current vehicle are about $300,000. The system is being 
promoted as an affordable expendable. Large production numbers could drive per unit 





Sounder’s simplicity, affordability, expendability and rapid deploy ability will be 
an asset in a high threat combat environment. As an expendable device, it can become an 
allocated asset to the tactical commander level. The commander would have the 
autonomy and flexibility to expand both communication and sensor ranges rapidly to 




Sounder is very inflexible in terms of mission profile. Its altitude must be 
predetermined and cannot be changed once airborne. Its slow speed significantly reduces 
its operational employability, and could force early mission termination in situations 
where station keeping could not be maintained. Small payload capability and low 
available power is an additional problem area for Sounder. Because of its requirement for 
light payloads, it might not be possible to find COTS technology that can provide 
significant military applications. Payload developmental costs would increase the bottom 
line. 
 
5. Mission Suitability 
 
Sounder will be restricted in the number of missions it can perform simply 
because of its slow speed and low payload capacity. In the wireless comms role, it will be 
restricted to the UHF spectrum because it will technologically difficult to carry a high 






There are a number of challenges with this craft. The first is with the propulsion 
system. On its maiden test flight, as the airship became fully inflated, it began a series of 
rapid pitching moments before reaching horizontal flight attitude. The force of these 
gyrations snapped the small propeller, thus ending the station-keeping portion of the test. 
Additional tests are planned in 2001. 
Another unknown is the affect of thermal cycling. The airship has not flown at 
night and the engineers are not sure how the super-pressurized bladder will handle the 
temperature changes. There is simply no baseline of data to pull from, according to the 
engineers. The potential change in volume might bring the craft down. More data points 
are also needed on the heat dissipation from the solar cells. Since the cells are internal, 
the engineers expressed concern over the heating and subsequent pressure increase. Too 
much pressure on the hull could rupture the craft. [Int01] 
 




Of all of the systems researched, the least developed is in the area of large solar 
powered airships. Designs promised large superstructures, capable of accommodating 
heavy payloads and large power generation systems. A number of companies have 
formed promoting these ideas and searching for funding, however, to date, none of these 
systems has reached the prototype stage.  
One such system is Sky Station. Numerous publications and a professional 




• The timeline for fielding the system was on-schedule for delivery in 2002. 
• The airship would be able to remain on station for a five year period in 
stratospheric winds of up to 35 m/sec (68 kts) 
• Payload capacity of up to 1800 kg 
• Capable of supplying 15 Kwatts of continuous power 
• Support to one million communications customers using the 47-48 GHz 
frequency band or three million customers using 3 GHz 
• User terminals would be similar to current cellular phone size and power 
• A 5-inch directional flat antenna would be required for the higher 
frequency bands. [Phi01] 
 
The Federal Communications Commission approved the use of the 47-48 GHz 
range for use by HALE platforms, but that has proven to be the only real success thus far. 
Sky Station had entered into initial talks with Lockheed Martin Global 
Telecommunications to build the airship, however, the authors discovered that the 
partnership has dissolved due to lack of funding. 
 
 





There are only artist’s depictions of what the Sky Station airship would look like. 
Vehicle size is variable, custom configured but expected to the average approximately 
515 ft long and 203 ft in diameter at the widest point. A large array of solar cells will 





The advantage that this system if ever fielded is its tremendous endurance and 




There are numerous disadvantages that this system faces. The first is its 
deployability. Because of its size, there will be difficulties in developing a reliable 
method to transport it worldwide and deploy it for tactical uses. Its slow speed makes it 
less responsive to self-deployment. Its operational range will be restricted in latitude, like 
Helios, due to lack of sufficient solar energy. Its large size will increase its detection 
potential. Finally, its restriction to a specific pressure altitude gives it less flexibility. 
 
5. Mission Suitability 
 
The sky station would be best suited in the communications role but can perform 





The first challenge is simply a lack of a prototype from which to build a baseline. 
Deployment by 2002 is impossible. Additional issues all relate to hull strength. In 
particular: 
 
• Power – The artist depictions of solar cells on the hull cause a number of 
difficulties. First they will build heat that will potentially transfer to the 
hull and rupture it. The cells will be heavy, further increasing the stress. 
• Thermal – Besides the solar cells, normal day/night thermal cycling will 
provide significant stress. 
• Propulsion – The propulsion system will be a major hurdle. This is a large 
airship designed for speeds of up to 68 kts IAS. It will not only require 
large propeller blades, but additional structural strength for mounting the 
motors in the rear of the craft. 
• Deployment – A craft this large will require a significant amount of 
ground support hardware that increases the risk of accidental rupture. 




























Concerning the issue of HALE platform operations in a combat scenario, there are 
agencies such as the Naval Space Command and Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
who have expressed doubt over their survivability against hostile actions. It is believed 
that this lack of survivability hinders HALE effective application for widespread military 
needs. In this chapter two major areas on survivability are examined. First the authors 
will analyze space vulnerabilities as they relate to natural causes, launch risks, and hostile 
actions. Secondly, HALE platform capabilities are analyzed in the same general 
categories.  
 
B. SPACE VULNERABILITIES 
 
Space can offer a safe haven from many hazards but it is not a benign regime and 
there are many risks associated with space applications. Before looking at the 
survivability issues with stratospheric platforms, a review is done on some of the 
vulnerabilities involved with space in general. They come under three main categories; 
natural causes, launch risks, and hostile actions. 
 
1. Natural Causes 
 
a) Orbital Decay 
 
LEO satellites below 600 km experience significant orbit decay due to 
Earth’s atmospheric drag. For an example, a 50 kg/m2 satellite at an altitude of 600 km 
can be expected to remain in orbit for 3430 days∗ (9.4 years), whereas the same satellite 
                                                 
∗ Based on worst-case scenario, operating at solar maximum in the 11 years sunspot cycle. 
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at 550 km would decay in 801 days [Wer99, back tables]. Satellites designed to operate 
in Earth’s drag require onboard propulsion systems, which add complexity, mass, and 
cost. In cases where propellant is depleted or the satellite propulsion system 
malfunctions; a manned support mission could attempt a recovery operation. However, 




This phenomenon affects SATCOM in the UHF bands and is caused by 
ionosphere disturbances occurring in the 40-600 km altitude range. The disturbances 
cause rapid phase and amplitude fluctuations of satellite signals observed at or near the 
earth. The most intense scintillation events cause rapid degradation of radio signals 
between the hours of 2000 to 0300 and occur within 20 degrees of the Earth’s magnetic 
equator. This encompasses over one third of the globe and is where most of the recent US 
military operations have occurred. [Bal01] 
Scintillation can adversely affect frequencies up through L-Band (2 GHz).  
The military UHF band, specifically 200-275 MHz, is particularly susceptible and is 
where the UHF Follow-on (UHF/FO) and Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSAT) 
satellites currently operate. Though significant scintillation events can be predicted, there 
exists the potential for communications degradation during these periods. Decreased 
operational effectiveness is the ultimate penalty. Combat operations occur around the 
clock and the United States relies on its capabilities to “own the night”. Assured access to 
wireless communications is required in order to support dispersed units and provide 
reachback capabilities to achieve mission success. [Bal01]  
 
c) Charged Particles 
 
Space is a harsh environment filled with high-energy charged particles 
produced directly from the solar wind and indirectly from the Van Allen belts. They can 
and have harmed spacecraft in three ways:  
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• Charging – the particles can build up on parts of the spacecraft and destroy 
electronic circuits. 
• Sputtering – sand-blasting effect that can destroy thermal coating and 
sensors over time 
• Single Event Upsets – a high energy particle can penetrate the spacecraft 
and cause a “bitflip” in electronic circuitry. [Sel94 p.74]  
 
Much time, effort, and money has been allocated to shielding spacecraft 
from these damaging affects.  
 
d) Space Debris 
 
The number of objects in space continues to grow as an ever-increasing 
number of nations become “space ferrying.” Currently, the US tracks nearly 10,000 
objects in space larger than softball in size. Collisions with smaller particles, not tracked, 
traveling at velocities on the order of 17,000 MPH can cause significant damage. In 1994, 
the odds of a LEO satellite striking a 1 mm size object on orbit were 1/1000 over a one 
year period. Those odds are increasing.  [Sel94, p. 71]  
 
2. Launch Risks 
 
As with any system there are associated risks with their operational employment. 
Many consider satellites to be relatively secure once established on orbit. However, 
getting there is still not a “sure thing” and a look at some recent launch mishaps show 
that it is not only costly in terms of dollars, but also in supporting national security 
objectives. 
Space launch is “rocket science,” and a look at the track record shows it can be a 
problem. Over little more than a one-year period from 1998 through 1999, the US Air 
76 
Force had six launch failures, which either ended in destruction or with satellites stranded 
in useless orbits. The total cost of these failures was about 3.5 billion dollars. 
Three of the six failed launches were attributed to the Titan IV rocket. The 
significance can be expressed simply in terms of the lost payloads: a National 
Reconnaissance Office satellite on 9 Apr 1998, a DSP satellite on 9 Apr 1999, and a 
MILSTAR communications satellite on 30 Apr 1999. [Hil99] These failures cause a 
chain reaction of difficulties; new replacement spacecraft must be produced, another 
launch vehicle contract must be let, and a new launch date scheduled. The US typically 
doesn’t have many, if any, spare spacecraft sitting around for just such a situation. The 
high cost of spacecraft preclude spare procurement, for instance, MILSTAR is an $800 
million satellite system. [MSC99] The end result could be a supportability gap - the 
inability to provide space assets for the warfigher’s needs. 
 
3. Hostile Actions 
 
The final category researched concerns hostile action. Most of the major world 
powers have publicly denied they have active programs involving anti-satellite (ASAT) 
technologies. It might not be wise to trust that this will continue to be the case with 
potential adversaries. Many countries believe the United States’ reliance on space support 
is its “Achilles heel,” and it would be in their best interest to have the capability to deny 
that access. The Secretary of Defense and the incoming Joint Chiefs of Staff have both 
predicted that it is only a matter of time before space is militarized. 
Few nations have the ability to reach geostationary orbit, so it is safe to assume 
that those platforms are the least vulnerable. LEO assets are another story though. 
Current ASAT technology is available to a growing number of third world 
countries. These countries are acquiring the capability to place payloads into LEO, thus 
posing a threat to other LEO systems. Russia has developed numerous ASAT systems 
since the 1960’s; co-orbital, low-level nuclear, laser systems, and aircraft launched 
missile systems. The most feasible of these is the co-orbital attack system. The system 
uses a radar tracking system for terminal guidance and boosters to correct for orbital 
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injection errors. From 1968-1971, five out of seven attempts were assessed as successful. 
This series of tests validated an operational envelope of 230 – 1000 km. [Joh94 p. 346-
347] 
Many spacecraft have no self-defense capacity, and are thus vulnerable to attack. 
A LEO spacecraft’s orbit crosses most of the globe; therefore, there will be a number of 
difficulties in protecting them. Upgrading systems already in orbit with self protection 
devices would be fiscally and technically challenging. Determining the origin of an 
ASAT attack is another posing question.  
 
C. HALE VULNERABILITIES 
 
While it is not possible to compare HALE and satellite vulnerabilities in the same 
specific areas, it is possible to describe vulnerabilities in the same general categories; 
natural causes, terminal risks, and hostile actions.  
 
1. Natural Causes 
 
HALE systems are not vulnerable to the natural causes that affect space systems, 
but they are affected by weather phenomena. The most significant effect will be during 
accent to their stratospheric stations. Storms, icing, lightning, and turbulence will all 
potentially damage these craft if not avoided. Once on station, the only real concern will 
be winds, which can push them off course. 
 
2. Terminal Risks 
 
HALE terminal phase operations can be more likened to aircraft than spacecraft. 
Like spacecraft, the launch phase will provide risk to HALE employment; however, there 
exists an additional recovery risk that will affect the rapid re-employment of the asset.  
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3. Hostile Actions 
 
Threats to HALE systems from enemy action come in two categories: surface–to-
air missiles (SAM’s) and airborne threats. A consideration of airborne threats would not 
be complete without at least mentioning the ability to negate that threat. The concept of 
aerospace control is a core competency of the USAF. Together with the air capabilities of 
naval forces, the US has successfully deterred enemy air actions dating back to the 
Korean War. Aerospace control assures the friendly use of the aerospace environment 
while denying its use to an enemy. [Sec97, p. 29]  
In order to keep this chapter in the unclassified realm, an analysis is provided on 
generic survivability issues that affect HALE platforms.  
Further research is required to determine specific SAM and airborne threat 
capabilities to HALE craft, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In general though, a 
brief review of threat systems show that there are limited systems with the capability to 
effectively reach the stratosphere. For those systems that can reach stratospheric heights, 
HALE platforms can be deployed at standoff distances while still providing effective 
capabilities.  
The following survivability characteristics show general threat issues where 




(1) Infrared (IR) - Many missile threats use infrared guidance 
systems for the tracking and terminal phases of guidance; therefore, conventionally 
powered HALE vehicles will be most susceptible to the IR threat. However, all of the 
solar powered craft will offer natural protection against these systems. 
 
(2) Radar - Most of the platforms researched are large, and 
thus will exhibit large radar cross-sectional areas. What is unknown is the degree of 
stealth ness to be obtained by using composite materials vice metals. 
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(3) Visual - Large aircraft usually make for better, more 
pronounced visual signatures. Sounder, for instance, has an obvious visual signature due 
to the sunlight reflections. Even at stratospheric heights (70,000+ ft) the airship was 
visible to ground observer. Condensation trails (contrails) are another visual cue military 
aircraft strive to avoid. The stratospheric atmosphere is nearly deplete of water vapor, 
making this a non-issue while at station-keeping altitudes. 
 
b) Electronic Protection 
 
Currently, the Global Hawk is the only system designed with a suite of 
self-protection gear to counter threat missile systems. A Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), 
Decoys, and self-protect jammers could be installed on any HALE craft. However, 
additional protection features come at the expense of payload in terms of size, weight, 




Integrated RWR systems can initiate defensive maneuvers to 
aerodynamically defeat threat missiles. The slower HALE platforms, such as Helios, 
Sounder and Sky Station, will not be capable of effectively employing such a RWR 
system.  
 
d) Altitude Safety 
 
The stratospheric regime offers natural protection against systems with 
insufficient boost capacity to reach HALE stations. It is a relative issue within the HALE 
classes. The conventionally powered platforms are typically more altitude constrained. In 
particular, Proteus will be most vulnerable in terms of altitude protection.  
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Additionally, HALE craft will enjoy a long line of sight horizon at these 
altitudes. This will allow for increased standoff ranges, well beyond the FLOT, while still 
providing the requisite coverage for the mission at hand.  
 
e) Doppler Protection 
 
Slower HALE systems have an advantage over higher speed systems in 
avoiding detection from certain pulse Doppler radars. 
These vulnerabilities were only those the authors felt were important in 
relation to HALE survivability. Overall, it shows that no C4ISR platform, from space or 
the stratosphere, will be impervious to attack or risks. Further analysis is required to 
determine which systems will fair better in an operational environment. 
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VII. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will provide analysis in a number of CONOPS areas. First, it will 
detail the range of military operations where HALE craft may operate. Secondly, it will 
detail issues involved with deploying HALE assets into a theatre of operations. Thirdly, it 
will describe the various mission support areas where HALE craft will be utilized. These 
specific mission areas include: communications connectivity, theatre ISR support, Blue 
Force Tracking, strategic deterrence, and GPS support. Finally, it will provide the reader 
notional coverage capabilities for real world scenarios.  
 
B. RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
 
The range of military operations is defined in a number of different ways. For the 
purpose of this research, it is defined in terms of the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia. 
Military operations are divided into two general categories: war and military operations 
other than war (MOOTW). War involves high-risk combat operations to forces while 
MOOTW operations can either include combatant or noncombatant operations. War 
examples include attack, defend, and blockade missions. MOOTW, however, is more 
expansive and can include peace enforcement, counter-terrorism, show of force, raid, 
strike, peacekeeping, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Nation assistance, 
counterinsurgency, freedom of navigation, counterdrug, protection of shipping, and US 
civil support. [JCS97 p. 609] 
The authors, in determining CONOPS support, have concluded the HALE 
platforms can effectively support each of these missions in some capacity. HALE 
platforms can be more easily integrated into MOOTW operations and combat operations 
that do not present significant anti-air threats. However, there are still employment 
considerations that make them effective in all ranges of operations.  
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As HALE platforms become operational, they will need to be included in the 
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) system. This information is included 
in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) data portion of the 
operations plan. For each HALE platform, detailed deployment data must be generated, 
to include, sequencing into the theatre, transportation requirements and logistical support. 
[JCS97 p. 703]  
In general, for all missions where hostile actions do not present dangers to HALE 
craft, they would deploy with the initial forces and be situated directly over the area of 
interest for maximum coverage and support. In conflicts involving threats to HALE craft, 
they are envisioned to provide standoff support to the front lines and transition forward as 
the front lines advance or the SAM and anti-air threats subside.  
 
C. EMPLOYMENT ISSUES 
 
The following will detail general CONOPS issues for utilizing the various HALE 
platforms researched in this thesis. The authors envision a combination of HALE assets 
acquired because they each offer unique strengths, however, the specific type and number 
are beyond the scope of this research. The overall command and control structure is not 
specifically defined by the authors, but the general concept is to assign both the platform 
and payload to the JFC for coordination.   
 
1. Global Hawk 
 
The Global Hawk will be flown as a national and theater asset. Developers are 
working to obtain Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval for the Global Hawk 
to have widespread authorization to fly in controlled airspace. In the scope of this thesis, 
the focus is more on supporting tactical users.  
When required, the Global Hawk will be assigned in support of the Joint Force 
Commander’s (JFC’s) requirements, with the Joint Force Air Component Commander 
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(JFACC) as the principal agent for integrating and synchronizing its use. The minimum 
support unit will include: at least two air vehicles, a launch and recovery element (LRE), 
and a mission control element (MCE). Actual numbers of system components will 
depend on the specific theater employment concept. [USA02] 
Global Hawk will notionally deploy from a NATO standard, 8000 ft x 150 ft wide 
landing strip, which would be either a main operating base (MOB) or a forward operating 
location (FOL). Ideally, once deployed, it would recover at a FOL for maximum on-
station capabilities. [USA02] In the ISR role, sensor information will be sent to the 
appropriate users for processing, exploitation, and dissemination. In the communications 




The envisioned deployment CONOPS for a Proteus class craft would be similar to 
the Global Hawk. Once assigned to a JFC, Proteus would be self-deployed into theatre 
while is logistics support followed. There are two main differences between a Proteus and 
Global Hawk employment: 1) Proteus would need to operate from a FOL to be effective 
because it has a much shorter range than the Global Hawk, and 2) Because it is manned, 
Proteus is unlikely to operate close to the FLOT, especially in the presence of a credible 
anti-air threat. 
As far as mission employment, Proteus is envisioned to be more applicable to the 
communications support roles rather than ISR. Its large antenna makes it more effective 




Helios, like the Global Hawk, can provide both national and tactical support in 
both ISR and communications roles. As a communications platform, Helios can offer the 
higher look angles needed for urban environments. The authors envision the Helios being 
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employed in the lower latitudes whenever needed and at higher latitudes in the summer 
months because of its solar energy limitations. High stratospheric winds pose an 
additional problem for Helios operations.  
Helios is uniquely suited to operate in a strategic deterrence role, due to its large 
coverage area and long dwell. The authors envision Helios in service, providing a semi 
permanent presence over key strategic areas of interest such as the Straits of Taiwan. 
Helios is slow, but modular, and should therefore be transported into the theatre 
of operation then launched. A wide tarmac or runway is all that is required for launch.   
 
4. Sounder  
 
The authors envision the Sounder as a quick response, rapidly deployable, 
disposable asset. Sounder could be launched from an area near the FLOT or from the 
deck of a ship to support mobile communications expansion or ISR on a smaller scale 
because of the low payload capability. Several Sounders could be packaged and 
transported as part of the normal deployment pack-out. A shelf life would have to be 
identified and any special storage and handling considerations addressed. Payload 
integration and checkout would be accomplished prior to launch, probably in an enclosed, 
protected space. The actual launch would probably require fair weather to mitigate 
deployment and payload risks. Launch operations could be conducted with a crew of no 
more than five individuals. Current and forecast weather data, especially wind 
information, would be used to determine the best launch location for precise insertion.  
Retrieval issues will need to be considered since it will possibly drift over hostile 
territory, or through international airspace in high winds. It’s expendable status means it 
can be employed in any threat scenario. Preprogrammed waypoints inside a “track box” 
would be uploaded prior to launch. If Sounder fails to maintain the “track box” or drift 
out of LOS range, an automatic destruct mechanism will terminate the mission.  
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D. MISSION SUPPORT AREAS  
 
In the mission support capabilities, there are five envisioned general support 
missions.  
 
1. Communications Connectivity 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, it is clear that communications connectivity 
provided by HALE craft can be a significant force enabler in the Network Centric 
Environment. Effective employment will depend on the communications payload 
capability and HALE positioning to best support the JFC’s operational goals. Backwards 
compatibility, interoperability and scalability should all be key design consideration for 
HALE systems development. Communications payloads should not only crosslink with 
other HALE systems, but with both commercial and military SATCOM systems.  
The JFC commander will ultimately determine his connectivity needs. However, 
generally in low threat environments, HALE craft should be placed directly over the 
theatre of operations to provide maximum connectivity to all warfighters. Considerations 
should be made to move it as far forward to the FEBA as necessary to reach front line 
troops with the highest priority in communications support. In high threat scenarios, 
HALE will typically operate in a standoff mode and still provide reachback capabilities 
to front line units.  
 
2. ISR Support 
 
ISR support offers the JTF commander numerous options. First, commanders 
must prioritize needs in terms of intelligence requirements. Once these priorities are 
decided, the HALE platforms will again be configured with the appropriate sensors. The 
positioning of the ISR platforms will likely be as far forward as possible depending on 
the operational picture and threat situation. This will give the HALE system maximum 
capability to monitor the enemy order of battle. Unlike many of today’s sensor assets, 
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HALE products will be sent to both the front line users and to supporting intelligence 
agencies for further analysis. This capability will enable the NRT support and sensor-to-
shooter requirements of the future.  
 
3. Strategic Deterrence 
 
This is a mission that will use many of the same ISR assets but have a different 
focus in terms of its mission. Studies are currently being done to determine the feasibility 
of using HALE systems, particularly the solar powered craft, as part of the US’s strategic 
defense architecture. Notionally, they will be able to perform functions such as detecting 
missile launches and providing tracking data to the missile defense systems that are in 
development.  
Additionally, deterrence capabilities are provided in the strategic realm because 
HALE systems can provide continuous surveillance and warn of potential military 
actions. This long-term surveillance, particularly on Naval activities, provides deterrence 
against surprise attacks from potential adversaries.  
 
4. Blue Force Tracking 
 
Blue force tracking (BFT) involves communicating and disseminating a unit’s 
Global Positioning System (GPS) position via a low power, low data rate beacon 
transmission. Although the function of blue force tracking is essentially provided via the 
connectivity capabilities of HALE systems, the authors felt this mission should be briefly 
covered because it is a mission area that has been an elusive goal and will only get more 
difficult in the Network Centric Age.  
Why is it so difficult to track and identify friendly forces? The U.S. military’s 
doctrine exploits the battlefield through fast tempo maneuver warfare. This means that 
the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and fire support coordination line (FSCL), 
which are the primary means of coordinating fires, can rapidly and unexpectedly change. 
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Knowing friendly positions is essential. The Persian Gulf conflict proved how modern 
maneuver warfare still requires a better system of tracking friendly forces in a combat 
environment. Had US Forces become more entangled with Iraqi forces, the friendly fire 
situations would have likely been higher. The following statistics relate fratricide 
incidents during the Persian Gulf conflict: 
 
• Over 70% of US tanks and armored personnel carriers hit by fire were 
from friendly forces 
• At Al Kafji, an errant A-10 Maverick missile hit a Marine unit 
• At Al Kafji, an A-6 bombed a Saudi unit 
• An A-10 attacked 2 British APC’s 
• An Apache helicopter attacked 2 Army APC’s 
• A Marine gunship attacked a Saudi National Guard unit 
• 2 additional British APC’s were hit. [Cla99, p 420-425] 
 
Currently, there is a program for Space-Based Blue Force Tracking (SB-BFT) that 
provides support on a global scale by tracking friendly forces. These assets will, however, 
be insufficient to track the large numbers of troop needed in major conflicts. The authors 
feel that HALE platforms offer the best answer to BFT shortfalls because of their long 
dwell and good coverage capability. 
 
5. GPS Support 
 
This mission, like the BFT mission, essentially relies on connectivity capabilities. 
However, it should be briefly mentioned because it is a defined new mission in the UAV 
roadmap. The concept is to use HALE platforms as GPS pseudo-satellites to provide 
theatre and tactical users clearer reception and reduced vulnerability to GPS jamming 
through higher retransmission signals. The specific hardware and software requirements 
are not yet identified. [OSD01, p ii] 
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E. CONOPS SCENARIOS 
 
1. Chinese-Taiwan Conflict  
 
In the ongoing tension in the Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan, there is a 
requirement to maintain situational awareness on Chinese military activities as they relate 
to Taiwan. The denial of a surprise attack and thus deterrence is the objective. Space 
assets alone will not provide for the continuous dwell time and high resolution required, 
however, a HALE platform could complement space platforms to attain NRT 
surveillance.  
If the tensions in the region rise, the US would desire continual monitoring of the 
situation with ISR assets. Global Hawks could deploy from bases in Japan and provide 
24/7 coverage.  
Figure 12 depicts a Global Hawk class platform operating at 65,000 ft in 
international waters monitoring the Chinese order of battle. The figure shows that most of 
the littorals can be monitored by one craft. Scalability in terms of numbers of craft could 
cover the entire littoral region. The 0° look angle, which covers the entire map is not 




Figure 12.   Taiwan Strait Scenario 
 
2. Middle East Conflict Scenario 
 
There is a continuing US presence in the Persian Gulf to ensure stability in the 
region. The main threat to Kuwait still comes from Iraq. If there is aggressive activity 
coming from Iraq, there will be a requirement for both communications connectivity and 
ISR support. Again, space assets will fall short. 
HALE platforms can be deployed in theatre from local bases and provide 
immediate support in all ISR and communications roles. Figure 13 depicts a Helios class 
HALE platform supporting ISR and communications from a station in Kuwait at 95,000 
ft. The imagery support from 10° and above covers the entire Kuwait border with Iraq 
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while SIGINT and communications capabilities can range the entire theatre. The 0° look 
angle, which provides SIGINT and connectivity support, encompasses the entire map.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Middle East Scenario 
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VIII. HALE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In previous chapters, the authors laid the groundwork for arguing that HALE 
platforms are required for warfighter support. The various developmental HALE systems 
were described and their CONOPS envisioned. This chapter provides a comparative 
analysis between the various HALE systems in terms of; instantaneous area of access, 
costs, endurance, survivability, feasibility, flexibility, and responsiveness. Many of the 
HALE systems are still in their infancy, so a true trade-off studies is not possible. What is 
possible is a comparison and illustrative analysis between the HALE systems researched. 
 
B. COMPARATIVE PROCESS 
 
This process consists of defining the authors measures for each category, 
bounding the problem, providing weighted criteria where needed, and comparing the 




The alternatives considered are the same five platforms described in detail in 
Chapter V - Global Hawk, Helios, Proteus, Sounder, and Sky Station.  
Key system design criteria were selected and weighted based the authors’ 
judgment for a near term and long term HALE solution. Many of the measures are 
disaggregated into sub criteria. The sub criteria are also weighted in order to further hone 
the user’s desires.  
Criteria are scored using utility curves, and for the purpose of this study, have 
been normalized to fall between 0-10. The best alternative is chosen after aggregating the 
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criteria scores and identifying the highest total score for a short-term and long-term 




Trade criteria were identified in areas that have the greatest potential for affecting 
the successful design and deployment of HALE platforms. The following categories were 
selected: 
 








1. Instantaneous Access Area 
 
If HALE platforms are to provide satellite augmentation and supplementation, 
they will require large area coverage to support the maximum number of troops possible. 
A definition and calculation of IAA was provided in Chapter IV.  
For this comparison, the authors used the lowest IAA measurements based on a 
typical ISR airborne altitude (RC-135) of 35,000 ft with a look elevation angle of 0° and 
a score of 0. The upper limit was set at 105,000 ft, which is near the current upper 
reaches of HALE craft with a score of 10. A linear utility curve was utilized to compute 
the score for each platform, see Equation 10. Table 9 shows the resulting scores; whereas, 
Figure 14 gives a graphical depiction of the IAA comparison results.  
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IAA( )score( ) 5
25
xy = −     Eqn. 11 
 
 Altitude IAA (103 nm2) Radius (nm) Score 
Low (RC-135) 35,000 125 195 0 
Proteus 62,000 220 265 3.8 
Global Hawk (GH) 65,000 230 271 4.2 
Sounder 70,000 250 281 5.0 
Sky Station (SS) 70,000 250 281 5.0 
Helios 100,000 355 336 9.2 
High value 105,000 375 344 10 
Table 9.   IAA Score Results 
 


















As the U.S. military works to modernize its forces, various support and weapons 
programs will continue to contend for limited monetary resources. Space-based 
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communications and ISR assets are high cost items that have to compete with weapons 
programs for military and congressional budget support.  
The relatively affordability of HALE platforms is attributed to fewer specialized 
components and less redundancy. HALE platforms offer potential costs savings by 
incorporating COTS technologies into both platform and payload design. The use of 
COTS and GOTS are an essential cost reduction measure, but satellites typically utilize 
high cost, high-risk developmental items and/or space-qualified parts. 
Space systems require numerous special designs such as: 
 
• Hardened electronics to counter the radiation environment 
• Special thermal designs to withstand dramatic temperature changes while 
on orbit 
• System redundancy to ensure high reliability because on orbit repairs are 
not always possible and if possible, costly  
• Complex attitude control systems that can keep the spacecraft properly 
oriented 
• Large antennas and/or power requirements to allow sufficient link margins 
for communications 
• Large apertures and antennas to fulfill the ISR roles 
 
Additionally, space provides no launch-on-demand capability for surge 
operational shortfalls.   
The following analysis provides a utility score as a function of cost for current 
HALE platforms. Cost estimates were obtained via public documents, personal 
interviews with corporate sponsors, or in some cases, the authors’ “best judgment” when 
no information was available. The authors set their scores at 0 for a high price of 
$20,000,000 and 10 for a low price of $200,000 for the HALE costs. The range of values 
led to the selection of a logarithmic utility curve; see Figure 15. Equation 11 was used to 
compute the cost score, normalized to a value between 0-10. Cost criteria results can be 




cost(x)score( ) 10 5 log
200
y   = − •         Eqn. 12 
 
 Cost ($1000) Score
     High value 20,000 0 
Global Hawk (GH) 15,300 0.6 
Sky Station (SS) 10,000 1.5 
Proteus 8,000 2.0 
Helios 5,000 3.0 
Sounder 300 9.1 
     Low value 200 10.0 














































Long endurance is the key to take full advantage of operations in the stratosphere. 
Ideally, one wants continuous coverage.  
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The endurance comparison presented here represents the best aspirations of the 
HALE designers, in most cases. Only the Global Hawk and Proteus have validated flight 
performance figures thus far.  
Endurance score determination was based on the dynamic range of the platforms 
being analyzed. Proteus helped set the low-end value and Helios the high. Because 
Proteus was determined to have some utility, the lower end score of 0 was placed at 5 
hours. The upper bound score of 10 was set at 5000 hours, which resulted in a 
logarithmic scale. Upon normalizing the score (y-axis) from 1-10, Equation 12 was 
derived and used to calculate each platforms endurance score. Table 11 shows the 




endurance(x)score( ) 3.33 log
5
y  = •       Eqn. 13 
 
 Endurance (hrs) Score
Low value 5 0 
Proteus  8 0.7 
Global Hawk (GH) 36 2.9 
Sounder 336 6.1 
Sky Station (SS) 720  7.2 
Helios 4320 (6 mos) 9.8 
High value 5000 10.0 















Proteus GH Sounder SS Helios
 




HALE craft survivability is a major concern. It is assumed that simple protection 
measures like operating the vehicle at standoff ranges will be utilized; however, UAV’s 
are prime candidate for the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions. Therefore, selection of 
the best HALE platform should include a comprehensive analysis of vulnerabilities and 
protection measures.  
The analysis presented here is by no means a complete or rigorous vulnerability 
risk assessment. Proper attention to this subject is a thesis project itself. The authors 
provide a limited analysis in Chapter VI to help support their assessment of the threat to 
HALE platforms.  
Each of the seven individual measures identified in Table 12 were afforded equal 
weight in this analysis. Totals are merely the sum of the individual columns. The 
measures used to determine survivability were graded using the following ordinal scale: 
98 
 
3 = Least vulnerable or Protected 
2 = Vulnerable or Marginally protected 
1 = Very vulnerable or Not protected 
 
 Global Hawk Helios Proteus Sounder Sky Station
IR signature 1 3 1 3 3 
Radar signature 1 1 1 1 1 
Visual signature 3 2 3 1 1 
Electronic Protect 3 1 1 1 1 
Maneuverability 3 1 3 1 1 
Altitude Protect 1 3 1 2 2 
Doppler Screen 1 2 1 3 3 
Total 13 13 11 12 12 
Table 12.   Survivability Factors 
 
The totals on table 12 show that overall, these stratospheric platforms are close in 
terms of survivability. The ultimate determinant in their survivability results from an 
analysis of the specific threats faced in a theatre of operations.   
The range of possible survivability factor totals was taken and plotted across the 
x-axis on the graph in Figure 17. After normalizing the resulting scores from 0-10, 
Equation 13 was used to compute each individual platform score. Table 13 shows the 
results of the survivability analysis.  
Global Hawk and Helios scored highest, but for different reasons. Global Hawk is 
the more maneuverable asset and has protection features installed. Helios gains its 
advantage through high altitude protection, and minimal IR signature. 
 
5score( ) survivability( ) 5
7




Low value 7 0 
Proteus 11 2.9 
Sounder 12 3.6 
Sky Station (SS) 12 3.6 
Global Hawk (GH) 13 4.3 
Helios 13 4.3 
High value 21 10.0 






















Technological feasibility is an important criterion when considering the widening 
communications bandwidth gap. New systems will have to be brought on-line within the 
next 5-10 years or else there will be deteriorating support and the inability to move 
towards a network centric vision. Global Hawk and Proteus share a degree of proven 
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technology. Helios has demonstrated a high altitude flight up to nearly 100,000 ft, but 
further development of a nighttime energy storage system is needed. Sounder has made 
only one short-duration flight, while Sky Station has no prototype available. Figure 18 
depicts the authors’ judgment, from High to Low, of the technological feasibility of 
current HALE craft. “High” equates to the most viable near term solution – the system 






















Operational flexibility is one of the stronger arguments for HALE employment. 
The fact that HALE platforms will be retrievable and reusable makes them well suited to 
tailored payloads, probably with some sort of plug and play functionality. The theatre 
commander may want communications equipped HALE craft to provide surge capacity 
and/or various ISR packages available to support intelligence gathering requirements.  
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For the purpose of this tradeoff analysis, communications missions were divided 
into simple comms relay and radio wide area network (WAN). Radio WAN includes 
netted comms, comms-on-the-move, IP multi-casting and broadcast. Imagery Intelligence 
was split between EO/IR and SAR, with SAR being the more constraining mission area 
due to payload weight, size, and complexity. Signal Intelligence capabilities were 
subdivided into detection and geo location. A system’s detection capability is based on 
frequency coverage; specifically, the number, size, and weight of RF tuners and antennas 
that the platform can support. Single platform geo location techniques typically require 
aircraft motion.  
The scoring of this category is the authors’ judgment. The authors scored each 
mission area to determine the overall measure of the platforms flexibility. Mission areas 
were equally weighted, thus results are obtained by merely summing the individual 
columns. The following ordinal scale was used:  
 
3 = Capable 
2 = Marginal 
1 = Not capable 
 
Table 14 shows the totals for each platform. The range of the possible totals were 
plotted and normalized to generate the plot found on Figure 19. Flexibility scores were 
calculated using Equation 14.  
 
 Global Hawk Helios Proteus Sounder Sky Station
Communications      
    Relay 3 3 3 2 3 
    Radio WAN 3 3 3 1 3 
IMINT      
    EO/IR 3 3 3 3 3 
    SAR 3 1 2 1 1 
SIGINT      
    Detection 3 3 3 2 3 
    Geo Location 3 1 2 1 1 
Total 18 14 16 10 14 
Table 14.   Flexibility Factors 
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5score( ) flexibility( ) 5
6
y x  = • −        Eqn. 15 
 
Table 15 shows the results of the flexibility analysis scoring. Boundaries were set 
with a low factor of 6 equal to 0 and a high factor of 18 equal to 10. Global Hawk was 
determined to be more flexible than Sounder due to the number of different payloads, and 
thus, mission areas it can support. Sounder has serious weight and size constraints that 
hurt its ability to flex to the theatre commander’s required mission needs. The airships 
and Helios were determined incapable of Spot Mode SAR because of their slow airspeed. 
For similarly reasons, these platforms were considered incapable of providing single 
platform SIGINT geo location.  
 
 Factor Score
Low value 6 0 
Sounder 10 3.3 
Helios 14 6.7 
Sky Station (SS) 14 6.7 
Proteus 16 8.3 
Global Hawk (GH) 18 10.0 
High value 18 10.0 















Sounder Helios/SS Proteus GH
 




HALE craft will be called upon to augment satellite assets in crisis situations. 
Therefore, they must be capable of rapid deployment to theater, expeditious employment 
to on-station, and dynamic re-orientation if already on-station. A definition of the 
responsiveness factors follows: 
 
• Deployable – the time it takes to relocate the asset into theater from the 
time the operation order is giving. 
• Employable – the time it takes to launch the asset from the forward 
deployed base until on-station. A function of launch and airspeed. 
• Dynamic re-tasking – the time it takes to reposition the asset to a different 
operational area. A function of airspeed. 
 
The authors either objectively or subjectively scored each category based on their 
knowledge of operational support requirements and airspeed metrics. Weights were 
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added by the authors to stress the deploy ability measure. In order for the CINC to 
employ the asset or dynamically re-task it, the platform must first be capable of getting 
into theatre. Deployability was determined to be twice as important as re-tasking. 
Responsiveness factor totals, found in Table 16, were based on the following 
ordinal scale measurements:  
 
3 = Best or Most capable 
2 = Capable 
1 = Worst or Incapable 
 
 Weight Global 
Hawk 
Proteus Helios Sounder Sky 
Station 
Deployable  2 2 x 2 2 x 2 1 x 2 3 x 2 1 x 2 
Employable  1.5 3 x 1.5 2 x 1.5 1 x 1.5 1 x 1.5 1 x 1.5 
Dynamic Re-tasking  1 3 2 1 1 1 
Total  11.5 9 4.5 8.5 4.5 
Table 16.   Responsiveness Factors – Measurements and Weights 
 
Sounder was determined to be the most deployable. The authors envision the 
disposable Sounder airship forward deployed, sitting in a crate ready for employment at 
any time. All the other HALE craft will most likely be flown into theatre. Some will take 
longer than others based on maximum airspeed and other support factors.  
Global Hawk was deemed most responsive because of its maneuverability and 
airspeed capabilities. The airships, and Helios are just too slow and thus warrant lower 
marks.  
Responsiveness factor totals were normalized and plotted. Equation 15 was used 
to calculate the final responsiveness score for each platform. Table 17 shows score 
results, whereas Figure 20 gives a graphical representation of the responsiveness results. 
Boundaries were set with a factor of 3 equal to 0 and a factor of 15 equal to a score of 10. 
 
5score( ) responsiveness( ) 2.5
6




Low value 3 0 
Sky Station (SS) 4.5 1.3 
Helios 4.5 1.3 
Sounder 8.5 4.6 
Proteus 9 5.0 
Global Hawk (GH) 11.5 7.1 
High value 15 10.0 
















Figure 20.   Responsiveness Comparison 
 
E. HALE ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
 
As a result of the HALE platform comparison analysis, it is recommended that 
Global Hawk fulfill the near term HALE requirement and that Helios should be 
considered as a long-term solution.  
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1. Near Term 
 
The importance of fielding a HALE platform in the near term, the next 5-10 years, 
led the authors to weighting feasibility higher than any other criteria.  Additionally, it was 
felt that the system should offer good survivability and flexibility at an affordable cost. 
For the purpose of this analysis, less importance was placed on the remaining factors. 
Table 18 and Figure 21 show the overall results of the near term analysis.  
Global Hawk is the clear winner of the near term analysis, mostly due to its high 
marks in feasibility and flexibility. But, keep in mind; the weights here are based solely 
on the authors’ view given the need to procure a near term fix. An actual Analysis of 
Alternatives would involve gaining the user’s perspective at ever step in the System 
Engineering Process, especially, during the tradeoff process. A more complete analysis 







































Weight 4 6 4 6 7 6 4  
Global Hawk 16.8 3.5 11.4 25.7 63.0 60.0 28.3 208.8 
Helios 36.8 18.1 39.1 25.7 17.5 40.0 5.0 182.2 
Proteus 15.2 11.9 2.7 17.1 56.0 50.0 20.0 173.0 
Sounder 20.0 54.7 24.3 21.4 14.0 20.0 18.3 172.8 
Sky Station 20.0 9.0 28.7 21.4 7.0 40.0 5.0 131.2 

































Results of Near Term Comparison Analysis
 
Figure 21.   Comparison Analysis Results – Near Term Solution 
 
2. Long Term 
 
Long term results differ because of the weighting effect. Emphasis here was 
placed on a true High Altitude, Long Endurance vehicle. To that end, IAA and endurance 
were afforded the greatest weights. The platform was envisioned being utilized primarily 
in the communications role at standoff ranges. Cost and feasibility rated higher than the 
remaining categories. Table 19 and Figure 22 display the result of the long term look.  
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The Helios solar powered UAV came out on top due to high totals in the two most 







































Weight 6 5 6 4 5 4 4  
Global Hawk 25.2 2.9 17.1 17.1 45.0 40.0 28.3 175.7 
Helios 55.2 15.1 58.7 17.1 12.5 26.7 5.0 190.2 
Proteus 22.8 9.9 4.1 11.4 40.0 33.3 20.0 141.6 
Sounder 30.0 45.6 36.5 14.3 10.0 13.3 18.3 168.1 
Sky Station 30.0 7.5 43.1 14.3 5.0 26.7 5.0 131.6 






































Results of Long Term Comparison Analysis
 
Figure 22.   Comparison Analysis Results – Long Term Solution 
 
The conclusions that the authors arrive at from this comparative analysis are 
based on their own judgment and the limited data from the various HALE programs. 
Other studies would likely draw different conclusions, given additional data and the 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
In this final chapter a summary is provided on the breadth of the research and 
analysis conducted in the area of HALE platforms. Secondly, the authors provide their 
general conclusions concerning the unique potential that HALE platforms offer US forces 
both in the near and far terms as they transition to the Network Centric Environment. 
Finally, general recommendations are given that the Navy and Marine Corps should 
adopt in order to provide both a vision for the future and a strategy for developing 





This thesis begins with a description of the armed services future needs in term of 
communications and ISR support as they relate to their warfighting doctrines. An overall 
assessment of the requirements and deficiencies was included concerning the available 
communications and ISR support. Secondly, the current SATCOM and ISR assets were 
reviewed to provide the supporting documentation about what is actually available to the 
warfighter. Thirdly, there is extensive analysis provided on the advantages of utilizing 
HALE platforms from stratospheric heights. Fourth, a general description of ongoing 
HALE programs is given in terms of their phase in development, strengths, weaknesses, 
and challenges. Sixth, there is a chapter devoted to the survivability capabilities of HALE 
craft. Finally, two chapters are devoted to trade-off analysis between the various HALE 




There are a number of conclusions that the authors arrived at during the course of 
the research. The following are those considered most pertinent. 
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The first and probably most important is that future warfighting doctrines cannot 
be effectively implemented, either fiscally or technologically, without capabilities that 
HALE type platforms provide. The stratosphere offers unmatched niche capabilities in 
many mission areas.  
Secondly, in terms of the most viable options from HALE support, the authors 
have made the following conclusions in terms of priorities: 
 
• The Global Hawk offers the most feasible option in HALE capabilities for 
communication and ISR because it is a fully funded and validated system. 
It is the closest HALE platform nearing operational employment and 
offers global reach. 
• Proteus type platforms provide the next best solution for near term 
augmentation to the Global Hawk because it is also proven technology. In 
terms of payload, they have the capacity for large antennas, which benefit 
the mobile user. Secondly, in terms of self-deployability and potential 
overflight issues, a manned aircraft can offer advantages over UAV’s 
requiring support elements. 
• The Helios type platforms offer the next most likely long-term option for a 
continuous airborne asset. It has validated its flight regime capabilities and 
only needs to overcome nighttime power issues. It’s recent record flight at 
96,500 ft validated the capability to operate in that regime and provide 
advantages in coverage over other stratospheric systems 
• Finally, the authors have concluded that solar powered airships, such as 
Sounder, will be the most difficult platforms to develop because they face 
the most difficult technological challenges. Though they do offer potential 
and affordable support to the tactical commanders in expanding their 
battlespace communications and ISR support, they also will be the least 
flexible platform in terms of range of operation.   
 
Thirdly, further analysis is required to determine if the overall C4ISR architecture 
should include a variety of HALE platforms because each has weaknesses in 
supportability. For example, Helios offers the potential for uninterrupted coverage but 
cannot support winter operations at high latitudes. Global Hawk and Proteus offer global 
access but include a larger logistic support system and shorter duration flights. Finally, 
Sounder offers affordable tactical assets to front line units but is a less flexible 
expendable.  
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Fourth, the authors have concluded that HALE platforms are particularly useful to 
operations at sea and in the littorals. The freedom of movement through international 
airspace and lack of terrain obstructions enable maximum effectiveness of stratospheric 
platforms.   
Finally, the authors have concluded that the Navy and Marine Corps are not 
devoting sufficient money, personnel, or focus on emerging HALE systems to get a 
quality product to the fleet in the near future. A report by Defense Week recently stated 
that the “Navy planners are taking a wait-and- see-approach: incorporating technologies 
already being developed by the Air Force into the sea service’s own operational needs 
and developing its own capabilities when other systems fall short, said the chief of Navy 
UAV systems”. [Low01] This lack of focus is evident in the fact that the Naval Service 
has a stated need to integrate UAV’s into its communications and ISR structure but yet 
does not have a mission statement concerning the types, numbers, or capability 




There are a number of specific actions that can be taken to ensure that the Navy 
and Marine Corps can leverage these emerging systems for their use. They include a two-
prong approach towards a Network Centric Capability. The first involves actions in the 
development of HALE platforms and the second is a parallel approach in developing the 
interoperable payloads that can be carried on the HALE systems.  
In terms of HALE development, the following actions are recommended:  
 
• First, and probably most important, the Navy and Marine Corps need to 
provide a vision statement and plan for leveraging HALE systems for their 
warfighting needs. There are currently programs in both services studying 
and developing lower altitude aircraft and UAV’s for communications and 
ISR support but none yet specifically on the HALE platforms covered in 
this research. This vision should include both short and long term plans.  
• The second recommendation involves more active participation in the 
development of current HALE platforms, specifically the Global Hawk. 
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To ensure that the Global Hawk will be fully interoperable with Navy and 
Marine Corps C4ISR architectures, it is imperative that the Navy and 
Marine Corps have more input in its development. An operational plan for 
its implementation is needed in terms of missions, required aircraft, and 
command structures to facilitate real-world support. 
• Third, the services should take a more active role in monitoring 
commercially developing stratospheric nodes for potential military 
applications. The Helios and Proteus are examples of these systems.  
 
In the payloads area, the services need to develop communications and ISR 
equipment that will be adaptable and scalable for the variety of HALE systems in 
development. 
In the ISR area equipment should include: 
 
• Lightweight high-resolution digital imagers that are easily installed 
• Maximum use of COTS technology that can provide adequate support and 
affordable prices 
 
In the communications area the equipment should include:  
 
• Router-to-router capabilities for all systems to provide the plumbing 
needed for networking. 
• Protocol development that will enable multi-casting networks for 
widespread user support 
• Airborne Communications Nodes (ACN) capabilities able to process a 
variety of digital frequencies and retransmit on all frequencies used by the 
warfighters in theatre 
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